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DISSING CONGRESS 
©Ruth Colker* and James J. Brudney** 
My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the Court with 
the presumption of constitutionality. That presumption reflects 
Congress's status as a coequal branch of government with its own 
responsibilities to the Constitution. But if Congress is going to take the 
attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme 
Court worry about the Constitution ... then perhaps that presumption is 
unwarranted.1 - Justice Antonin Scalia 
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent leader­
ship has invalidated numerous federal laws, arguably departing from 
settled precedent to do so. The Rehnquist Court2 has held that 
Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in five instances during 
the 2000-01 Term,3 on four occasions during the 1999-2000 Term4 and 
* Heck-Faust Memorial Chair in Constitutional Law, Michael E. Moritz College of 
Law, The Ohio State University. 
** Newton D. Baker - Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, Michael E. Moritz College of 
Law, The Ohio State University. - Ed. 
We thank Victor Brudney, William Eskridge, Cynthia Estlund, Philip Frickey, Steven 
Huefner, Sylvia Law, Deborah Malamud, David Shapiro, Timothy Simeone, faculty at The 
Ohio State University College of Law summer workshop, and workshop participants at 
Villanova University School of Law for extremely helpful comments and suggestions. Par­
ticipants at the July 2000 annual meeting of the American Bar Association heard some of 
the arguments found in this Article, and we are grateful for their responses as well. We of 
course are responsible for all remaining errors of commission or omission. We received ex­
cellent research assistance from John Deeds, Michelle Evans, Brian Ray, Stephanie Smith, 
Paul Wilkins, and the College of Law Library research staff, particularly Kim Clarke. We 
also received generous financial support from the USX Foundation and The Michael E. 
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1. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speaking at the Telecommu­
nications Law and Policy Symposium (Apr. 18, 2000). See A Shot from Justice Scalia, WASH. 
POST, May 2, 2000, at A-22 (quoting passage but omitting second sentence). We transcribed 
the entire quotation, including the second sentence, from a videotape loaned to us by the 
Law Review of Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. The Law Review was a 
cosponsor of the symposium at which Justice Scalia spoke. 
2. Our argument focuses on the Rehnquist Court since the 1994-95 Term, following the 
retirements of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. In this Article, we refer to the 
"Rehnquist Court" to mean the Court in its last seven Terms, through 2000-01 .  
3 .  See Bd. of  Trustees of the Univ. of  Ala. v .  Garrett, 121 S .  Ct. 955 (2001) (Title I of  the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, as applied to the States; 5-4 vote); Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (1996 funding restriction in Legal Services Corporation Act; 
5-4 vote); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001) (application of federal wiretapping 
statute to third parties' publication of intercepted conversations; 6-3 vote); United States v. 
80 
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in a total of twenty-nine cases since the 1994-95 Term.5 Commentators 
typically explain these decisions in federalism terms, focusing on the 
Court's use of its power to protect the States from an overreaching 
Congress.6 
That explanation is incomplete and, in important respects, unper­
suasive. The Rehnquist Court has not been as solicitous of states' 
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. 1782 (2001) (Social Security tax as applied to Article III judges; 5-4 vote); 
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001) (assessment imposed on private 
industry by Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act; 6-3 vote). 
4. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (congressional attempt to over­
ride "Miranda warnings"; 7-2 vote); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 
803 (2000) (regulation of sexually explicit channels on cable; 5-4 vote); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (the private right of action under the Violence Against 
Women Act; 5-4 vote); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimina­
tion in Employment Act, as applied to the States; 5-4 vote). In this Article, we focus in par­
ticular on the decisions in Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett as reflecting a trend in the Court's 
developing methodology for considering the constitutionality of Congress's actions. 
5. The remaining twenty cases in which the Court invalidated federal legislation since 
1994 include the following ten cases which we will discuss in this Article: Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (FLSA as applied to States; 5-4 vote); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Act as applied to the 
States; 5-4 vote); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627 (1999) (Patent Act as applied to the States; 5-4 vote); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417 (1998) (line item veto; 6-3 vote); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Act 
requiring that local law enforcement officers conduct background checks; 5-4 vote); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (Communications Decency Act; 7-2 vote); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act; 6-3 vote); Seminole Tribe 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; 5-4 vote); Adarand Construc­
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (federal practice encouraging contractors to hire sub­
contractors based on race-conscious criteria; 5-4 vote); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act; 5-4 vote). The ten additional cases not discussed in this 
Article are: Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (Act 
prohibiting broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino gambling; 9-0 vote); E. Enter. v. Ap­
fel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act; 5-4 vote); United States 
v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998) (Harbor Maintenance Tax; 9-0 vote); 
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (Indian Land Consolidation Act; 8-1 vote); Denver 
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act; 6-3 vote); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (Federal Election Campaign Act; 7-2 
vote); United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996) (Section 4371 of the Internal Reve­
nue Code; 6-2 vote); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (Federal Alcohol 
Administration Act; 9-0 vote); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (§ 27 A(b) 
of Securities Exchange Act; 7-2 vote); United States v. Nat'! Treasury Employees Union, 513 
U.S. 454 (1995) (Ethics in Government Act; 6-3 vote). 
6. See, e.g., Mitchell S. Lustig, Rehnquist Court Redefines the Commerce Clause, 
N.Y.L.J. 1, 4 (Aug. 28, 2000) ("[I]nstead of employing its activist tendencies in the name of 
economic due process, the new mantra of the Rehnquist Court appears to be the Tenth 
Amendment and States' Rights"); Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Supreme Court Wrap­
Up: U.S. Supreme Court 1999-2000 Term Review, 161 N.J. L.J. 709 (Aug. 14, 2000) (reporting 
on the Court's aggressive policing of Congress as "part of a 35- to 40-year trend, one that 
stems from 'direct attacks on state sovereignty' "). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Principle 
and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sover­
eign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953 (2000); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Feder­
alism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Feder­
alism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997). 
82 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 100:80 
rights as one might expect if it were operating primarily from a feder­
alism perspective. Even apart from its highly controversial foray into 
Florida election law,7 the Court in recent years has not been shy about 
invalidating state statutes or governmental actions based on its own 
conception of what federal power or federal limits require.8 Moreover, 
7. See Bush v. Gore, 53 1 U.S. 98 (2000). Although a discussion of Bush v. Gore is be­
yond the scope of this Article, we note that one might view the Court as having decided the 
Florida election dispute at least in part in order to avoid having that dispute resolved by the 
United States Congress. Bush v. Gore would then constitute a sixth decision in the 2000 
Term that had the result of expanding the role of the Court at the expense of Congress. 
Compare Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650-53 (2001 ) (ar­
guing that federal statutory intent and political question considerations strongly supported 
allowing the 2000 presidential election to be ultimately resolved by democratically elected 
branches of government), with John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 775, 789-90 (2001) (arguing that Court's intervention saved the country from having 
election ultimately decided through a "destructive partisan struggle" on the floor of 
Congress). 
8. In the 1999 Term, the Rehnquist Court struck down state statutes or government ac­
tions fourteen times, along with the four invalidated national laws mentioned in footnote 4, 
supra. Two or more of the Justices who most often vote to invalidate federal laws joined the 
majority in thirteen of those cases. We refer to Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, 
O'Connor, and Kennedy as most inclined to challenge actively the work of Congress based 
on the separation of powers perspective adopted in this Article. The thirteen state law cases 
in which some or all of these Justices voted to invalidate state statutes include, for example: 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that New Jersey's public accommo­
dations law, as applied to the Boy Scouts, violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of 
expressive association; 5-4 majority included all five Justices identified above); Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that student-led, student-initiated in­
vocations prior to football games, which were permissible under school district's policy, were 
impermissibly coercive under the First Amendment; 6-3 majority included Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating a Washington 
grandparents' rights statute; 6-3 majority included Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and 
O'Connor); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (holding that a Texas statute altering the 
legal rules of evidence and requiring less evidence to obtain conviction was impermissible ex 
post facto law as applied to obtain a conviction; 5-4 majority included Justices Scalia and 
Thomas); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (holding that Hawaii Constitution's restric­
tions on eligibility to vote for specific state agency violated Fifteenth Amendment; 7-2 ma­
jority included all five Justices identified above); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
528 U.S. 458 (2000) (holding that California's rules for taxing its share of multistate corpora­
tions' income violated Due Process and Commerce Clauses by impermissibly taxing income 
outside State's jurisdictional reach; 9-0 majority included all five Justices identified above). 
In the 2000 Term, in addition to intervening to resolve the Florida election dispute in 
Bush v. Gore, the Rehnquist Court struck down eleven state statutes or government actions 
along with the five national laws identified in footnote 3, supra. Two or more of the Justices 
who most often vote to invalidate federal laws joined the majority in all eleven of these deci­
sions. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001) (holding that Missouri ballot regulation 
violated the Elections Clause of Article I; 9-0 vote); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. 
Ct. 2404 (2001) (invalidating Massachusetts smoking regulations on preemption and First 
Amendment grounds; 6-3 majority included all five Justices identified above); Ferguson v. 
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that state hospital's urine testing and re­
porting program violated Fourth Amendment; 6-3 majority included Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor); Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001) (invalidating 
school's regulation of private Christian organization on free speech grounds; 6-3 majority 
included all five Justices identified above); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (hold­
ing that Washington statute regulating life insurance and retirement proceeds was pre­
empted by ERISA; 7-2 majority included all five Justices identified above); Shafer v. South 
Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (holding that state jury instruction in death penalty case vio-
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while it is true that many federal laws invalidated since 1995 have in­
volved assertedly unjustified intrusions on state interests, one cannot 
adequately understand this recent judicial activism toward Congress 
without employing a separation of powers perspective. 
In acting repeatedly to invalidate federal legislation, the Court is 
using its authority to diminish the proper role of Congress. Structur­
ally, the new activist majority has treated the federal legislative proc­
ess as akin to agency or lower court decisionmaking; in doing so, the 
Court has undermined Congress's ability to decide for itself how and 
whether to create a record in support of pending legislation. Substan­
tively, the Court has limited Congress's powers under the Commerce 
Clause9 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment;10 it may ulti­
mately constrain Congress's power under the Spending Clause as 
well. 1 1  By diminishing Congress's capacity to address what Congress 
lated right to due process; 7-2 majority included Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and 
O'Connor). 
This evidence that the five Justices referred to above have been so willing to invalidate 
state laws or policies casts doubt on whether the Rehnquist Court's activism in invalidating 
Congressional action can be best explained in federalism terms. One might well expect a 
Court that is protective of state sovereignty when Congress seeks to regulate States' conduct 
to adopt a comparably respectful position when the federal judiciary is asked to invalidate 
state action. See generally John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 
1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27 (1998). We do not, however, assume that the Court should neces­
sarily use the same methodology when reviewing the constitutionality of state and federal 
legislation. See infra note 169 and text accompanying notes 58-65, 90-97. Whether the cur­
rent Court's record of invalidating state governmental action reflects disrespect for the work 
of the political branches of state government is beyond the scope of this Article. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). Between 1937 
and 1995, the Court did not invalidate any federal legislation on the basis that Congress ex­
ceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding federal statute as within Congress's Commerce Clause 
powers), with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating federal statute as not 
within Congress's Commerce Clause powers). Since 1995, the Court has invalidated two fed­
eral laws on the basis that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause, and 
additional laws may soon be declared unconstitutional on that basis. For further discussion, 
see infra Part I .  
10.  U.S.  CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress the power "to enforce, by appropri­
ate legislation, the provisions of this article"). Between 1883 and 1997, the Court did not in­
validate any federal legislation on the basis that Congress exceeded its power under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), with 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Since 1997, the Court has invalidated five fed­
eral laws on the basis that Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. For further discussion, see infra Part I .  
1 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I , § 8, cl .  1 ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States . . . .  "). For an argument that the Court should re­
interpret its Spending Clause jurisprudence to reflect stronger federalism principles, see 
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995). 
The constitutional cases discussed at infra Parts II  & III are not the only evidence of the 
Court's increasing irreverence towards Congress. For example, the decision in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), applied an especially stringent "sub-constitutional" clear 
statement rule to conclude that Congress had not intended to regulate certain state employ-
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identifies as national problems, the Rehnquist Court is effectively us­
ing the Commerce Clause and Section 5 to circumvent the reasoning if 
not the holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author­
ity.12 
Justice Scalia himself has explained the Court's activism in separa­
tion of powers terms, maintaining that the Court's invalidation of fed­
eral legislation is appropriate because Congress has an "attitude."13 
Many of the invalidated statutes, however, were passed with broad bi­
partisan support by a legislature that was far from confrontational to­
ward the Court, during periods in which Congress would have had lit­
tle reason to think it was passing arguably unconstitutional 
legislation. 14 Moreover, there is evidence that even when Congress 
ees. Although the Court crafted that rule in federalism terms, its approach is consistent with 
the "disrespecting Congress" theme of this Article. The Gregory Court in 1991 imposed a 
new standard on Congress, demanding absolute congressional clarity in text from a 1974 
statute enacted in a very different era of judicial expectations. In Part II, we discuss this phe­
nomenon as part of a "crystal ball" problem. See also Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (relying in part on Commerce Clause limits imposed on 
Congress in 1995 through the Lopez decision to hold that a 1972 provision of the Clean Wa­
ter Act did not clearly authorize regulation of certain intrastate activities as substantially af­
fecting interstate commerce). 
12. 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (overruling Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976), and holding that the Court has "no license to employ freestanding conceptions of 
state sovereignty" based on the Tenth Amendment when resolving conflicts between con­
gressional authority and assertions of states' interests). For further discussion, see infra Part 
III. 
13. See supra note 1 .  The Washington Post story and the complete version of his com­
ments suggest that Justice Scalia was especially concerned about what he termed "legislative 
activism" in relatively recent years. His suggestion that the presumption of constitutionality 
may no longer be warranted, however, cannot be so readily cabined; it would seem to apply 
to the Court's treatment of the ADEA amendments of 1974 and the Americans with Dis­
abilities Act of 1990, as well as the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. See infra Parts II  
and III .  
14. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (5-4 
decision invalidating private damages remedy for employment discrimination against state 
employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62 (2000) (5-4 decision invalidating the private damages remedy under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 to apply to the States); 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (5-4 decision invalidating the private damages remedy 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended in 1974 to apply to the States); 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (5-4 
decision invalidating the private damages remedy under the Trademark Act of 1946, as 
amended in 1992 to apply to the States); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (5-4 decision invalidating the private damages remedy 
under the Patent Act of 1790, as amended in 1992 to apply explicitly to the States). 
The aforementioned statutes were not of particularly recent vintage. The Fair Labor 
Standards Act and the ADEA were extended to the States in 1966 and 1974. See Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 832, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(4) 
(modifying the definition of "employer" so as to remove the exemption of the States and 
their political subdivisions with respect to employees of hospitals, institutions, and schools); 
Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, section 6(a) (further ex­
tending FLSA to States); Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 
section 28(a) (extending ADEA to States). The ADA was enacted in 1990, five years before 
the Supreme Court initiated the series of decisions described in Part I that substantially re-
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passed legislation of doubtful constitutionality, it did so in a frame­
work of respect rather than arrogance.15 The Court has decided most 
of these cases on close votes, suggesting that reasonable people could 
disagree with respect to their constitutionality.16 
In this Article, we identify two distinct methodologies employed by 
the Rehnquist Court that have resulted in growing disrespect for 
Congress - the "crystal ball" and the "phantom legislative history" 
approaches. Under the crystal ball approach, the Court effectively pe­
nalizes the enacting Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative 
record, even though such a record requirement could not reasonably 
have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation and 
enactment.'7 Unlike private parties, who routinely must adjust their 
future conduct based on the Court's new teaching, Congress as a co­
equal branch is distinctive in its status and its relationship to the 
Court. This difference helps account for the presumption of constitu­
tionality that traditionally attends congressional enactments. The crys­
tal ball test, however, signals a marked departure from the longstand­
ing precedent of asking whether a legislative record could have 
supported the current constitutional standard had it been known to 
the enacting Congress. It also results in the Court micromanaging the 
work of Congress by specifying how Congress should construct a 
proper legislative record. 
Under the phantom legislative history approach, the Court ex­
presses interest in considering legislative history when assessing con­
stitutionality, but then establishes and applies a legal standard for re-
configured its relations with Congress. Finally, although the Patent Act was not extended to 
the States explicitly until 1992, some courts had ruled that the original Patent Act had always 
covered the States. See generally Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
627. 
15. When Congress has been aware that its legislation raises close constitutional ques­
tions, it has often included expedited review clauses to provide that the legislation can reach 
the courts in the most efficient manner possible. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't 
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (providing expedited review of Telecommunications Act's 
"signal bleed" provision, requiring cable operators either to scramble sexually explicit chan­
nels in full or limit programming on such channels to certain hours; 5-4 decision found fed­
eral legislation to be unconstitutional); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) 
(providing expedited review of Line Item Veto Act; 6-3 decision found federal legislation to 
be unconstitutional); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (providing expedited review of 
Communications Decency Act; 7-2 decision found federal legislation to be unconstitutional). 
Although expedited review procedures may have become more common in recent years, 
they appear to trace back at least several decades. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
(providing expedited review of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971; 8-1 decision 
found legislation to be unconstitutional). 
16. Of the twenty-nine decisions invalidating federal laws since 1995, fourteen have 
been decided by 5-4 votes and six more were decided by 6-3 votes. See supra notes 3-5. Of 
the thirteen decisions we discuss in this Article, ten were decided by a 5-4 margin and two 
more by 6-3 votes. See supra notes 3-5. 
17. For further discussion, see infra Part IL 
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view that even a detailed legislative record could not possibly satisfy.18 
The Court can be understood as transforming what had been consid­
ered proper factual questions within Congress's purview into legal 
questions for the Court's exclusive determination. The result is the 
Court taking greater power for itself, displacing Congress's proper 
factfinding role. 
The Court's decision in Board of Trustees v. Garrett19 underscores 
the existence of, and tension between, these two methodologies. On 
the one hand, the Court in Garrett demanded a depth and breadth of 
documentation to support the exercise of Section 5 authority that 
Congress could not possibly have foreseen in 1990 when it enacted the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). At the same time, by de­
manding a level of legislative factfinding that for practical reasons may 
be unattainable, the Court signaled that it is reserving the exclusive 
authority to determine when Congress has acted properly under Sec­
tion 5.20 
We do not wish to be understood as supporting every piece of leg­
islation passed by Congress. The Court's targets since 1995 have in­
cluded substantively "liberal" statutes protecting employees against 
status discrimination or substandard working conditions,21 more tradi­
tionally "conservative" enactments promoting religious freedom or re­
stricting sexually offensive speech;22 and neutral laws addressing pat­
ent or trademark matters.23 While the Rehnquist Court has not 
"dissed" Congress in every instance, its record of invalidations has 
been remarkably severe.24 We are disturbed by the Court's emerging 
18. For further discussion, see infra Part III. 
19. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act's authoriza­
tion of private employment discrimination actions for monetary damages against States is 
unconstitutional). 
20. For further discussion, see infra Part IV. 
21. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (invalidating the private damages 
remedy under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended in 1974 to apply to the 
States); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating the private damages 
remedy under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 to 
apply to the States). 
22. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating private damages 
remedy under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 
(invalidating the Communications Decency Act). 
23. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666 (1999) (invaliding the private damages remedy under the Trademark Act of 1946, as 
amended in 1992 to apply to the States); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating the private damages remedy under the 
Patent Act of 1790, as amended in 1992 to apply explicitly to the States). 
24. Since 1995, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of federal Jaws on several oc­
casions. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (9-0 decision holding that Driver's 
Privacy Protection Act, restricting States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information, 
is proper exercise of Congress's authority under Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment); 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (6-3 decision upholding constitutionality of statute 
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vision in which Congress has substantially diminished powers to con­
duct its internal affairs or to engage in factfinding and lawmaking that 
the judicial branch will respect. 
In Part I, we trace the development of this recent judicial activism 
in which disrespect for Congress is a fundamental element. In Part II, 
we describe the Court's decisions in Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents25 and United States v. Morrison26 as examples of the crystal ball 
approach, and we discuss the implications of this methodology for the 
internal operations of Congress and for the exercise of federal legisla­
tive powers. In Part III, we consider Kimel and Morrison as also illus­
trating the phantom legislative history approach and discuss the sig­
nificant implications of this methodology for the relationship between 
the courts and Congress. Finally, in Part IV, we invoke these two 
methods to help explain the contrast between the Court's asserted in­
terest in legislative record building in the constitutional law setting 
and its simultaneous disdain for legislative history when construing 
statutes in nonconstitutional settings. Part IV also addresses how the 
Court's legislative history approach, especially in the Section 5 area, 
may actually threaten traditional federalism objectives regarding the 
role of Congress. 
I. THE NEW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Since 1995, a new judicial activism has developed in which dis­
respecting Congress has become an important theme. Traditionally, 
respect for democracy, and in particular for the work of Congress as a 
coequal branch of government, has been a central tenet of judicial re­
view for both liberals and conservatives alike.27 Legal theorists have 
struggled from the Republic's inception to explain why judges should 
even have the power to review the constitutionality of legislative ac­
tion, given what Professor Alexander Bickel termed the "counter-
governing citizenship of illegitimate children born abroad of American father and alien 
mother); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (8-1 decision holding that federal 
criminal law does not violate Double Jeopardy Clause). Even though most federal statutes 
are never challenged in litigation because they are clearly constitutional, Congress's record 
of failure before the Rehnquist Court is highly unusual. 
25. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
26. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
27. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 7-8 (1980) ("The tricky task has been and remains that of devising a way or ways of 
protecting minorities from majority tyranny that is not a flagrant contradiction of the princi­
ple of majority rule . . . .  "); JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106 (1901) ("(I)t should be 
remembered that the exercise of Oudicial review), even when unavoidable, is always at­
tended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the 
outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and 
stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their 
own errors."). 
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majoritarian difficulty."28 After its initial declaration that Congress 
could not require the Court to act unconstitutionally in Marbury v. 
Madison,29 the Supreme Court did not conclude that Congress acted 
unconstitutionally until the infamous Dred Scott3° case. Subsequently, 
as with the substantive due process decisions in the early twentieth 
century31 and the Commerce Clause decisions overturning New Deal 
legislation in the 1930s,32 the Court's aggressive incursions into federal 
legislative affairs often appeared improper in hindsight.33 
The Court's decision in Marbury is typically the starting point in 
explaining the existence and validity of judicial review, particularly re­
view of legislation enacted by Congress. The very fact that the Court 
should have the power to invalidate a federal statute was not some­
thing taken for granted before Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall's suc­
cess in justifying the possible exercise of such a power signaled the be­
ginning of a cottage industry examining that topic.34 John Thayer, a 
leading nineteenth century voice on the subject, suggested that the 
way to resolve the tension between judicial review and democracy was 
28. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS B RANCH 16 (1962). 
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
30. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The Court in Marbury ad­
dressed only whether Congress could require the Court to act unconstitutionally, reasoning 
that it could not. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. Later, the Court adopted as a natural 
corollary that it had the authority to use the Constitution as a sword in invalidating acts of 
Congress. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (1 How.) at 455. We are grateful to David Shapiro for high­
lighting this distinction for us. 
31. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (overturning legislation that 
regulated employer's right to terminate employees); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905) (invalidating state legislation that regulated hours on job). 
32. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (overturning legislation that 
regulated labor practices in coal industry); A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (overturning legislation that regulated trade practices and certain mini­
mum working standards). 
33. Justice Holmes foresaw the problematic nature of the Court's social darwinism foray 
into public policy with his dissenting comment in Lochner that " [t)he Fourteenth Amend­
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 198 U.S. at 75. That quotation 
has been cited favorably on innumerable occasions in judicial decisions and law review arti­
cles. See also PETER H. IRONS, TH E NEW DEAL LAWYERS 290-300 (1982) (giving short shrift 
to the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the 1930s); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 231-37 (1963) (same). 
34. See generally RAOUL B ERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); 
WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: TH E CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1995); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, 
THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO 
JuDGE-MADE LAW (1986); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues 
in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1994); W. F. Dodd, The Function of 
a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201 (1915); Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Con­
stitutional Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79 (1993); Philip A. 
Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 
(1993). 
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for the courts to strike down legislation only when the legislative 
branch has made a "very clear" error.35 As Chief Justice Rehnquist re­
cently summarized the received wisdom in this area, " [d]ue respect for 
the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we 
invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that 
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."36 
This respect for Congress has been regularly voiced by the Court 
since the New Deal,37 and it was solidly embedded in legal doctrine by 
the mid-1970s through decisions under the Commerce Clause, Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the spending power.38 In 
35. See John B .  Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu­
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). 
36. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (referring to United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and United States v. 
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1880)). Of course, in Morrison, Lopez, and Harris, the Court over­
came the presumption of constitutionality that attends Congressional enactments. 
37. See, e.g. , R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., majority 
opinion) ("Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at 
an end. It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay 
the legislative decision,' Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S., at 612, because this Court has never 
insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. This is particularly 
true where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing . . . .  [T)he 
fact the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, 
rather than judicial, consideration."); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152, 154 (1938) ("[T)he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be pre­
sumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pro­
nounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it 
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis 
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators . . . .  [Our inquiry,) where the legisla­
tive judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts 
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it."). 
38. While this Article focuses on Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and 
Section 5, Congress's enumerated powers also include the power to "lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has 
broadly interpreted the spending power, like Section 5 and the Commerce Clause, for many 
decades. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that federal statute 
conditioning receipt of highway funds on adoption of minimum drinking age is valid use of 
Congress's spending power); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding 
that "the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes 
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution"). The 
Court's new activism, however, may be triggering a reconsideration of the scope of 
Congress's authority under the spending power. An Eighth Circuit panel held that section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 placed unconstitutionally broad and coercive condi­
tions on the State's receipt of federal funds, although that decision was later reversed by the 
full circuit. See Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1999), rev'd en bane 
sub. nom. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). The Fourth Circuit has re­
cently granted en bane review, presumably to address whether Congress was sufficiently ex­
plicit in section 504 when it applied its spending power as authority to waive States' sover­
eign immunity, suggesting that it too may be reconsidering the scope of Congress's authority 
under the Spending Clause. See Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 
212, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., dissenting), vacated en bane by 205 F.3d 687 (4th 
Cir. 2000). In addition, a district court in the Sixth Circuit recently held that Congress did 
not properly use its spending power authority to confer upon private individuals a right to 
enforce the terms of the Medicaid program against state officials. See Westside Mothers v. 
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Katzenbach v. McClung,39 the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
Congress had an ample basis under the Commerce Clause upon which 
to find that racial discrimination at restaurants had a direct and ad­
verse effect on interstate commerce.40 The Court understood that 
Congress should be given broad discretion under its enumerated pow­
ers to engage in factfinding to determine which kind of legislation is 
necessary to serve the public good under the Commerce Clause.4 1 
Two years later, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,  the Supreme Court 
authored an equally strong opinion affirming the broad reach of 
Congress's powers under Section 5.42 The Court held that Congress 
could regulate in the civil rights area under a lenient standard of re­
view pursuant to its Section 5 powers. In a highly respectful statement, 
the Court in Morgan observed: "It is not for us to review the congres­
sional resolution [of these competing considerations] . . . .  It is enough 
that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might re­
solve the conflict as it did."43 Similarly, in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach,44 the Court said that Congress could use "any rational 
means" to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimi­
nation so long as it had laid or could have laid a sufficient factual basis 
for the legislation.45 
Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see also Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 261 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding, with little explanation, 
that in light of Supreme Court's Garrett decision, Eleventh Amendment's immunity also ap­
plies for private actions brought under section 504 ). 
39. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
40. Justice Douglas, while joining the majority opinion, expressed his preference for a 
Section 5 justification for Congress's authority. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]he right to be free of discrimi­
natory treatment (based on race) in places of public accommodation - whether intrastate or 
interstate - is a right guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment and . . .  
state enforcement of the kind of trespass laws which Maryland had in that case was state ac­
tion within the meaning of the Amendment."). Justice Douglas's opinion also applied to 
McClung. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 279. 
41.  Justice Clark's opinion for the Court gave considerable deference to Congress's 
power to engage in factfinding: 
Congress has determined for itself that refusals of service to Negroes have imposed burdens 
both upon the interstate flow of food and upon the movement of products generally. Of 
course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to af­
fect commerce does not preclude further examination by this Court. But where we find that 
the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for find­
ing a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is 
at an end. 
McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04. 
42. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (7-2 decision). 
43. Id. at 653. 
44. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (8-1 decision applying Section 2 of Fifteenth Amendment). 
45. Id. at 324. While the Court in South Carolina construed Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, it was addressing the closely analogous issue of Congress's "appropriate" 
authority to implement antidiscrimination prohibitions of the Civil War Amendments as 
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The scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority received a 
further nod in Maryland v. Wirtz, when the Court ruled that Congress 
had the power under that clause to apply the Fair Labor Standards 
Act ("FLSA") to state employees.46 The Court recognized the Elev­
enth Amendment issues of proper relief that might arise in suits 
against the States but held that those issues did not preclude the Court 
from ruling that state employees could be covered by the FLSA. It ap­
plied the McClung holding, requiring Congress simply to provide a 
"rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the 
protection of commerce. "47 
This series of decisions understandably gave the Congress of the 
1970s little pause for concern as it enacted legislation regulating the 
States. Congress in 1972 amended Title VII to cover state employees,48 
and two years later it amended the Age Discrimination in Employ­
ment Act ("ADEA'') and the FLSA to cover state employees as 
well.49 Each bill included controversial aspects, but there is no hint in 
the legislative record of either statute that Congress was concerned 
about its constitutional authority to provide for private monetary 
damage actions against states. so Both the Commerce Clause and Sec­
tion 5 were understood to offer justifications for these extensions. 
Although the Court's decisions of the 1970s and 1980s provide 
hints that deference to Congress might be eroding, nothing dramatic 
took place to alter the fundamental legal landscape. The decision in 
National League of Cities v. Usery was an attempt to reign in 
Congress's Commerce Clause powers under the Tenth Amendment. s1 
Some commentators considered the National League of Cities decision 
against the reserved powers of the States. Id. at 308, 324. The language of Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to the language of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."), with U.S. CONST. amend. 
XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."). 
46. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The vote was 6-2; Justice Marshall did not participate in the 
case. 
47. Id. at 190 (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04). By distinguishing 
the question of the scope of the Commerce Clause from the question of the limitations im­
posed on Congress by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court in Wirtz did not permit federal­
ist impulses to derail its deferential approach to separation of powers issues under the 
Commerce Clause. 
48. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
49. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)) (amending FLSA); Fair Labor Standards Amend­
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b) 
(1994)) (amending ADEA). 
50. See infra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. 
51 .  426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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to be a significant development at the time,52 but the Court overruled 
itself fairly quickly in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.53 The Court ultimately concluded that National League of 
Cities created an unworkable distinction between "traditional" and 
"nontraditional" governmental functions.54 Further, even apart from 
its Garcia decision, the Court had ceased to find the distinction help­
ful. Both lower courts and the Supreme Court had declined to use that 
framework to invalidate federal legislation as improperly intruding 
upon the States.55 Decisions such as EEOC v. Wyoming56 and Johnson 
v. City of Baltimore57 gave members of Congress little reason to be­
lieve that National League of Cities had substantially diminished their 
powers to regulate the States under the Commerce Clause. 
52. Scholars writing shortly after National League of Cities disagreed about the impor­
tance of that decision. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: 
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1065, 1075-76 (1977) ("The language of National League of Cities is indeed quite con­
sistent with a protected state role premised on individual rights . . . .  In broad outline, the 
argument would be that policy-based legislation by Congress that endangers the provision of 
certain traditional services . . .  is constitutionally problematic not because it strikes an unac­
ceptable balance between national and state interests as such, but because it hinders and 
may even foreclose attempts by states or localities to meet their citizens' legitimate expecta­
tions of basic government services."), with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, American Constitutional 
Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 340, 344-45 (1978) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)) ("Also extravagant is Tribe's treatment of National League 
of Cities v. Usery as a seed decision for a bold vision of federalism in service of individual 
rights . . . .  For those lacking the intensely imaginative mind, National League of Cities is 
more securely explained as entirely apiece with, and a formidable addition to, a spate of re­
cent decisions in which the autonomy of state and local governments in 'Our Federalism,' 
not individual rights against the state, is the overarching concern."). 
53. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
54. Id. at 531 ("Our examination of this 'function' standard applied in these and other 
cases over the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of 
state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only un­
workable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with 
those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest. That 
case, accordingly, is overruled."). 
55. According to Professor Deborah Merritt: 
National League of Cities was a revolutionary opinion . . . .  In fact, however, National League 
of Cities had a limited impact on the law. Although litigants raised tenth amendment claims 
in more than three hundred cases reported after National League of Cities, courts rejected 
most of those claims. The Supreme Court itself never relied upon National League of Cities 
to invalidate any other federal law. Instead, the Court progressively narrowed the effective­
ness of its tenth amendment principles in a series of cases decided between 1976 and 1985. 
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee .Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third 
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 ,  1 1-12 (1988). 
56. 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding that extension of the Age Discrimination in Employ­
ment Act to cover state and local governments was a valid exercise of Congress's powers 
under the Commerce Clause and was not precluded by virtue of the Court's Tenth Amend­
ment decision in National League of Cities). 
57. 472 U.S. 353 (1985) (holding that provision in federal civil service statute requiring 
most federal firefighters to retire at age fifty-five did not establish that age fifty-five was a 
bona fide occupational requirement under the ADEA for nonfederal firefighters). 
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A suggestion that congressional power might be eroding in the 
Section 5 setting occurred in Fullilove v. Klutznick,58 in which the 
Court, without a majority opinion, sustained Congress's powers to 
create racial preferences under the Public Works Employment Act of 
1977.59 Two members of the Court (Justices Rehnquist and Stewart) 
concluded that Congress should be treated like state legislatures when 
it enacted racially conscious legislation.60 Nonetheless, Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for himself and Justices White and Powell, sustained 
the federal legislation in Fullilove under a framework imbued with 
deference to Congress.61 
58. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). An earlier hint of the Court's discomfort with broad Congres­
sional power under Section 5 can be seen in the Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 
U.S. 112 (1970), in which the Court upheld the franchise extension to eighteen-year-olds in 
federal elections but struck down its application to state elections. The Mitchell opinion, 
however, was described as "a constitutional law disaster," because it created a distinction 
between federal and state elections that was supported only by the opinion of one member 
of the Court, Justice Black. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Proc­
ess and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 609 (1975). Four Justices voted to sustain 
the franchise provision in its entirety; four Justices voted to invalidate it in its entirety. 
Professor Sager described this splintered holding as "betraying a state of analytical disar­
ray." See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu­
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1232 (1978). Justice Brennan, who authored 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), wrote an opinion in Mitchell in which he justi­
fied the voting rights extension under Section 5, but Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Blackmun, who were not members of the Court when Morgan was decided, did not join the 
Brennan opinion. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Justices Burger and Blackmun joined an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, arguing 
that Section 5 gave Congress power to do no more than "provide the means of eradicating 
situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 296 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The position taken by Justices Burger and 
Blackmun was short-lived; in subsequent cases, they joined opinions of the Court that were 
highly deferential to Congress's exercise of its Section 5 powers. See infra notes 63-64 and 
accompanying text. 
59. Under this law, ten percent of the federal funds granted for local public works proj­
ects must be used by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from busi­
nesses owned and controlled by members of statutorily identified minority groups. 448 U.S. 
at 453. Although the Supreme Court had applied strict scrutiny to racial preferences created 
by state government two years earlier in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978), Chief Justice Burger's lead opinion (for himself and Justices White and 
Powell) declined to impose such a rigorous test on the federal government. The concurrence 
by Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun insisted that the correct legal standard when 
affirmative action programs are enacted by the federal or state government is intermediate 
scrutiny. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 518. 
60. Id. at 526-29. The other dissenting opinion in the case - authored by Justice Stevens 
- concluded that affirmative action can be constitutionally created by Congress, but that 
this particular program was not constitutional because of the inartful way that the categories 
of beneficiaries were defined. Id. at 537-41. 
61. Id. at 472 ("A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial con­
text, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate 
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to 
'provide for the . . .  general Welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (omission in 
original). 
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The lead opinion held that the law could be justified under Section 
5 (as well as the Commerce Clause). To reach that conclusion, the 
Chief Justice examined the legislative history of the Minority Business 
Enterprise provision, carefully noting that Congress "may legislate 
without compiling the kind of 'record' appropriate with respect to ju­
dicial or administrative proceedings."62 Moreover, the lead opinion did 
not require that the record demonstrate problems at the state level. 
Indeed, the Chief Justice was willing to extrapolate from evidence re­
garding federal procurement contracts that similar problems existed at 
the state and local government level.63 Although federalism concerns 
had begun to surface with respect to some justices' understanding of 
the grant of power to Congress under Section 5,64 the Court in this 
same period remained highly respectful of Congress's authority to en­
act "appropriate" legislation regulating the States.65 
The Court also resisted an attempt to diminish Congressional 
authority under Commerce Clause jurisprudence in 1989 when it held 
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company66 that the Commerce Clause 
granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
The Court granted certiorari in Union Gas despite the fact that every 
Court of Appeals had concluded that Congress had the authority to 
62. Id. at 478. 
63. Id. 
64. The argument that Congress should be entitled to a more deferential standard than 
the States in the equality context did not command majority support from the Court in 
Fullilove. The liberal wing of the Court (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) thought 
that Bakke was incorrectly decided, and that remedial measures should pass muster under 
the standard imposed on the States or federal government under the Constitution. Id. at 517. 
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart also believed that there should be one constitutional stan­
dard in the equal protection context; under that uniform standard, the remedial program in 
Fullilove should be held unconstitutional, as the state remedial program had been in Bakke. 
Id. at 523. 
When Fullilove was decided, Justices White and Powell joined Chief Justice Burger's 
opinion concluding that Congress was entitled to greater deference than the States. Com­
bining Justices White, Powell and Burger with the liberal wing of the Court resulted in the 
Court upholding Congress's power to enact racial preference legislation. 
As recently as 1990, the traditional line prevailed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, with five members of the Court voting to uphold the policies of the Federal 
Communication Commission designed to favor minority broadcasting firms. See Metro 
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion, in 
which he emphasized that a lesser standard than strict scrutiny applied to the federal gov­
ernment when it created racial preferences for remedial purposes. Justices Burger and 
Powell were no longer members of the Court, but Justices White and Stevens joined the lib­
erals to form a majority vote for that position. 
65. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180-82 (1980) (adopting, by a 6-3 
margin, deferential stance toward Congress's judgment in 1975 that preclearance require­
ment of Voting Rights Act should be extended for another seven years as a constitutional 
method of enforcing Fifteenth Amendment); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) 
(upholding, by a 9-0 vote, Congress's Section 5 authority to extend Title VII to state em­
ployers against Eleventh Amendment challenge). 
66. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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abrogate states' immunity from suit when legislating pursuant to the 
plenary power granted it by the Constitution, such as the Commerce 
Clause.67 As in the Equal Protection Clause context, Justice White 
added the fifth vote in Union Gas to create a majority for that posi­
tion, although no opinion garnered the majority support of the Court. 
Justice White's separate opinion did not explain his rationale for con­
cluding that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.68 
Given this constitutional landscape, Congress again had little rea­
son to doubt the constitutionality of its work as it passed the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") in 1990.69 The ADA 
equally regulated the private and public sectors. It was widely under­
stood to increase the regulation of the private sector, because section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act7° already regulated the public sector. 
Hence, little thought was given to whether the ADA could constitu-
67. Id. at 15. The rationale for these conclusions was founded in the Court's decision in 
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), 
which held that "the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted 
Congress the power to regulate commerce." Id. at 191 . Over seventy years before Parden, 
the Court held that the grant of jurisdiction to federal courts under Article III did not itself 
abrogate state sovereign immunity as embodied under the Eleventh Amendment. See Hans 
v. Louisiana 134 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1890) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars claim in federal 
court alleging state violation of Contracts Clause). 
68. 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J . ,  concurring) ("I agree with the conclusion reached by 
Justice Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article I to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree with 
much of his reasoning."). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy, dissented on the Eleventh Amendment issue. Justice Scalia distin­
guished the Section 5 context from the Commerce Clause context by noting that the Section 
5 abrogation principles could not be applied to "antecedent provisions of the Constitution." 
Id. at 42. In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment could abrogate sovereign immunity 
because it was ratified after the Eleventh Amendment, but the Commerce Clause could not 
abrogate sovereign immunity because it was ratified before the Eleventh Amendment. 
Justice Scalia and the other members of the current conservative majority have argued in 
more recent cases, however, that sovereign immunity did not become embedded in the 
Constitution through the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 712-27 (1999). The narrow and awkward language of the Eleventh Amendment 
could not be understood to have created on its own such a sweeping sovereign immunity. 
Rather, the new understanding of sovereign immunity is that it was always a part of the Con­
stitution as an implied principle. Under this view, the ratifiers of the Constitution were 
aware of sovereign immunity principles when they granted Congress power under the Com­
merce Clause, just as later framers were aware of sovereign immunity principles when they 
granted Congress power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Scalia's 
chronological argument in Union Gas, distinguishing Congress's powers under the Com­
merce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, is no longer consistent with the 
more recent position taken by the Court majority, of which he is a part. 
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Congress would have reasonably thought it had 
authority to regulate the States pursuant to its Commerce Clause and Section 5 authority. 
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring entities that receive "federal 
financial assistance" not to discriminate on the basis of disability). 
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tionally provide for private damage actions against the state.71 Simi­
larly, Congress extended the patent and copyright laws to the States in 
bipartisan and noncontroversial legislation in 1992.72 Finally, the Gun­
Free School Zones Act73 and the Violence Against Women Act74 were 
part of omnibus crime bills opposed by the gun lobby. Although each 
bill attracted policy-based opposition, the constitutionality of the two 
provisions was not seriously challenged. 75 
71.  Although the Attorney General testified about the ADA on a couple of occasions, 
he was never asked about the constitutionality of ADA Title II during these hearings. See 
generally Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcom­
mittee of the Handicapped on S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989). For discussion of the Attorney 
General's testimony, see Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY 
J.  OF EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 384 (2000). The constitutionality of ADA Title II did not arise as 
an issue at any of the hearings held by Congress or in any of the reports prepared by 
Congress on the ADA. 
72. Congress considered the two bills concurrently. See generally S. REP. No. 102-280 
(1 992). The Senate Report reflects awareness that the Eleventh Amendment posed constitu­
tional questions concerning the validity of these bills but also an understanding that the most 
important factor was whether Congress was explicit in regulating States based on the Court's 
decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 ( 1985). See S. REP. No. 102-
280, at 5-8. The patent and trademark laws only stated that they covered "whoever" in­
fringed a patent or trademark. Some lower courts had held that that language was not suffi­
ciently precise to make the States subject to regulation. See, e.g. , Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. 
Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1 990); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). Congress therefore amended these laws in 1992 to make coverage of the 
States explicit. No one appeared to question the constitutionality of these measures. 
73. The Gun-Free School Zones Act was part of the Crime Control Act of 1990 that 
President Bush signed into law on November 29, 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 
4789, 4844-45 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1998)). 
74. The Violence Against Women Act was part of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 that President Clinton signed into law on September 13, 1994. Pub. 
L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941-42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1 3981 (1999)); see 
also Legislative History of Violence Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839. 
75. The legislative history for the Gun-Free School Zones Act is sparse. It was discussed 
at one House subcommittee hearing where Representative William Hughes, chair of the 
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee, asserted that the legislation 
would reflect "a major departure from a traditional federalism concept which basically de­
fers to State and local units of government to enforce their laws." House Hearings on H.R. 
3757, at 14. Although both the House and Senate sponsors of the bill made fairly lengthy 
floor statements about it, neither of them commented on the constitutionality of the meas­
ure. See 136 Cong. Rec. S175959 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kohl); 136 Cong. Rec. S766 
(1990) (same); 135 Cong. Rec. E3988 (1989) (inserted statement of Rep. Feighan). Despite 
signing the bill, President Bush did state that the Gun-Free School Zones Act provision "in­
appropriately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal 
law. The policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States, 
but they should not be imposed upon the States by the Congress." Statement of President 
George Bush on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 
1944, 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990). The President did not refer to his concerns as constitutional; 
given his oath to uphold the Constitution, one can presume he would not have signed the bill 
if he had genuine constitutional concerns. 
The Violence Against Women Act's ("VA WA") civil remedy provision received com­
paratively more examination by Congress. The Act was passed in 1 994, after the Supreme 
Court had granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act, but before the Court rendered its decision in Lopez. Although the Fifth Circuit had 
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Most of the statutes in this time period that Congress knew raised 
constitutional questions - the Telecommunications Act,76 the Com­
munications Decency Act,77 and the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act,78 for example - related to tugs of war between the courts and 
Congress regarding the scope of the First Amendment's protections 
for free speech and religious liberty.79 Jurists and scholars have dis-
ruled that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional, see United States v. Lopez, 
2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), Congress saw little need to defend the constitutionality of 
VA WA's civil remedies provision. As the Fifth Circuit itself noted in its opinion, it was the 
first appellate court to be asked to consider the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act. Id. at 1345. There was no developing trend in the appellate courts that might 
have alerted Congress to a shifting constitutional law standard in the Commerce Clause 
area. More generally, it is unrealistic to expect members of Congress to be aware of lower 
court decisions on a seemingly distinct topic (guns at school as compared to violence against 
women) and therefore to make last minute adjustments to pending legislation in light of pos­
sible future constitutional law developments. See also Robert Katzmann, Bridging the 
Statutory Gulf" A Challenge of Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662 (1992) (find­
ing that most lower court decisions are not noticed even by committee leaders and their 
staffs, much less by members in general). Not surprisingly, the Lopez Fifth Circuit decision 
was not mentioned at any VA WA hearing. 
During the several year period when VA WA was under consideration in Congress, 
members were given little reason to be concerned about VA WA's constitutionality. The 
principal statements questioning VA W A's constitutionality consisted of a letter from the 
Department of Justice, authored in October 1990, that questioned the constitutionality of a 
predecessor to VA WA, as well as testimony by attorney Bruce Fein, who stated in 1993 that 
"the bill in my judgment skates close, if not over, a constitutional line." Crimes of Violence 
Motivated by Gender, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House of Repre­
sentatives, 103d Cong., Nov. 16, 1993, at 26 [hereinafter "1993 VA WA Hearings"]. Fein, 
however, did not question Congress's constitutional authority to enact legislation in this 
area; rather, he questioned whether Congress's findings were factually sufficient to justify 
the bill. Id. In that regard, Professors Cass Sunstein and Burt Neuborne testified that 
VA WA was a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause and Section 5. See Violence Against 
Women: Victims of the System, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 102d Cong., April 19, 1991, at 87-88, 94-99, 103-07, 1 12-25; [hereinafter "1991 
VAWA Hearings"]; 1993 V AWA Hearings at 42-47, 51, 56-68 (reprinting their 1991 testi­
mony). When asked at the 1991 Hearings the level of proof necessary to make clear the con­
stitutional bases for the law, Sunstein responded: "Fortunately for the equal protection issue 
as well as for the Commerce Clause issue, the standard of review is the rational basis test. So 
you don't need a whole lot." 1991 VA WA Hearings, at 125. Similarly, Sally Goldfarb, Senior 
Staff Attorney of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, testified that both Section 5 
and the Commerce Clause were alternative constitutional bases for VA WA. See 1993 
VAWA Hearings at 13. Finally, James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General in the 
Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, testified at the 1993 hearings that both Section 5 
and the Commerce Clause provided constitutional bases for VAW A. Id. at 96-108. The con­
stitutional focus at these hearings (insofar as there was one) was whether Congress had en­
gaged in sufficient factfinding to meet the "substantial effects" test, not whether the "sub­
stantial effects" test was the proper constitutional standard for Congress to use in assessing 
the scope of its powers. As we discuss below, the evidentiary question of whether gender­
based crimes have a substantial effect on interstate commerce was not the basis on which the 
Court subsequently invalidated VA WA in Morrison. See infra Part Ill .  
76. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
77. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
78. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). An example from a slightly earlier 
period is United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating federal flag burning 
statute). 
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agreed over the constitutionality of congressional limitations in these 
areas throughout our history, including the 1990s.80 
Beginning in 1995, however, a series of Supreme Court decisions 
dramatically altered the separation of powers landscape. As Justice 
Scalia intimated in his recent speech, the Court has weakened the pre­
sumption that federal legislation is constitutional.8I The first major in­
dication that the presumption might be eroding occurred in 1995 in 
United States v. Lopez.82 A bipartisan Congress had passed the Gun-
79. Another statute involving anticipated constitutional controversy was the Line Item 
Veto Act. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). That statute, however, 
raised pure separation of powers issues unrelated to federalism. Again, the statute was 
highly popular in Congress, although members recognized concerns as to its constitutional­
ity. In recognition of this constitutional doubt, Congress created an expedited review proce­
dure while the bill was in Conference to have the statute's constitutionality tested quickly in 
court. In contrast to the many statutes reviewed at supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text, 
the legislative history of the Line Item Veto Act is replete with discussion of the constitu­
tionality of the measure and the best mechanism to have the constitutionality assessed. See, 
e.g. , H.R. REP. NO. 104-491, § 3, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. 6016, 6017 (1996) (setting 
forth expedited judicial review procedure); 141 CONG. REC. 8420 (1995) (remarks of Sen. 
Exon, bill supporter, recognizing constitutional questions); 142 CONG. REC. 6504-21 (1996) 
(remarks of Sen. Byrd, discussing constitutional problems at length); id at 6535-38 (remarks 
of Sen. Levin questioning constitutionality); id. at 6540-42 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers ques­
tioning constitutionality). 
One further constitutional controversy that arose during the 1990s involved limitations 
on the processes or mechanisms by which Congress may use its Article I powers to regulate 
the States. Without questioning Congress's authority to regulate directly, the Court held that 
Congress was prohibited by the Tenth Amendment from "commandeering" state legislative 
processes to regulate radioactive waste disposal on an indirect basis, and likewise was barred 
from commandeering a state's executive branch officials to regulate indirectly the purchase 
of handguns. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992). We regard these two decisions as relying primarily though not exclu­
sively on considerations of federalism, i.e., that Congress could not "blur state legislative [or 
executive J accountability to the state's residents by coercing the state's legislature [or execu­
tive] to act in accordance with a federally established agenda." DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 68 (1995). Their detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this 
Article. See SHAPIRO at 1 1 1-15 (discussing New York); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the 
Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (discussing 
Printz). 
80. At the RFRA hearings, Representative Henry Hyde expressed concern about 
whether Congress had the power to "restore" earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence through 
a legislative act. See Religious Freedom Act of 1991, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa­
tives, 102d Cong., May 13-14, 1992, at 95. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, Professor Douglas Laycock reassured Congress that it did have the 
power to enact RFRA under Section 5 because its enforcement powers "go beyond what the 
Court may do under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 397. Nonetheless, Professor Ira 
Lupu testified that RFRA suffered from constitutional problems and urged Congress to de­
fer enacting such legislation until it was able to read the Court's decision in a pending case 
- New York v. United States. Id. at 399. Professor Lupu, however, also informed Congress 
that factfinding "would buttress the case for constitutionality of the bill under Section Five." 
Id. at 399. For further discussion of RFRA and its legislative history, see Ruth Colker, City 
of Boerne Revisited, 70 U. CINC. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2001). 
81. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also supra note 13. 
82. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Earlier hints of a changing presumption can be found in 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (limiting Congressional regulation of state govern-
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Free School Zones Act of 1990, making it a federal offense "for any 
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."83 
Congress had little reason to question its constitutional authority 
to enact such legislation under the Commerce Clause. As discussed 
above, Congress under existing precedent merely needed to establish 
that there was a "rational basis" for concluding that a regulated activ­
ity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.84 The relevant legal ques­
tion would have been: "Could Congress rationally have found that 
violent crime in school zones, through its effect on the quality of edu­
cation, significantly (or substantially) affects interstate or foreign 
commerce?"85 
Although Congress did not include detailed findings in the 1990 
Act's legislative history demonstrating a substantial connection be­
tween gun-related violence and interstate commerce, one certainly 
could find support for such a conclusion in the testimony, reports and 
studies that had been generated both inside and outside of Congress.86 
ment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), and New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (holding that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act was 
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment because it commandeered state power). 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A). 
84. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). As 
Justice Souter stated in dissent in Lopez: 
The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative judgments "is a paradigm of judicial 
restraint." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). In judicial review 
under the Commerce Clause, it reflects our respect for the institutional competence of the 
Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of 
the legitimacy that comes from Congress's political accountability in dealing with matters 
open to a wide range of possible choices. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
85. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omit­
ted). 
86. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 3757 Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 44 (1990) (testimony of National Education Asso­
ciation that school violence contributes significantly to dropout rate and fear of such vio­
lence undermines schools' ability to retain qualified teachers and administrators); Joseph F. 
Sheley et al., Gun-Related Violence in and Around Inner-City Schools, 146 AMER. J. 
DISEASES CHILD. 677 (1992) (survey-based study involving over 1600 students finds that 
violence is brought into schools from outside, and interventions in community and social 
structures are the only feasible means of addressing problem). Justices Breyer, Stevens, 
Souter, and Ginsburg marshaled such evidence in their dissent. They argued that: 
reports, hearings, and other readily available literature make clear that the problem of guns 
in and around schools is widespread and extremely serious . . . .  Having found that guns in 
schools significantly undermine the quality of education in our Nation's classrooms, 
Congress could also have found, given the effect of education upon interstate and foreign 
commerce, that gun-related violence in and around schools is a commercial, as well as a hu­
man, problem . . . .  Finally, there is evidence that, today more than ever, many firms base 
their location decisions upon the presence, or absence, of a work force with a basic educa­
tion. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619-622 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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If one were operating under the presumption that Congress has acted 
constitutionally, such material might have passed muster. The Lopez 
Court, however, began to shift that presumption by viewing the cup as 
half empty rather than half full. It quoted all the caveats found in prior 
majority opinions about the limited scope of Congress's authority, de­
spite the fact that these prior opinions had all upheld Congressional 
authority.87 For the first time in many decades, the Court ruled that 
Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. 
Lopez initially was regarded by many observers as a relatively 
modest change, given the lack of explicit legislative findings to support 
the federal legislation at the time of passage and the narrow scope of 
the statute in question.88 But the Court in Lopez had taken an impor­
tant step in developing its new version of judicial activism, under 
which Congress was accorded less respect for its handiwork. The deci­
sion in United States v. Morrison,89 discussed in detail below, reflects 
the dramatic nature of the Lopez holding. The Morrison Court struck 
down a post-Lopez statute with a lengthy legislative history and broad 
statutory coverage. 
The second major indication of change in 1995 came shortly after 
the Lopez decision. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,90 the Court 
declared that Congress must abide by the same constitutional stan­
dards as the States in the equal protection context, despite the differ­
ing textual support for equality rules in the federal and state settings.91 
The principle of "congruence" between the rules that applied to the 
federal government and the States overrode the principle of respect 
for Congress as a coequal branch of government.92 
87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-58 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-
95 (1824); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1 11 ,  125 (1942)). 
88. See, e.g. , Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 685, 693 (1996) ("As a practical matter, Lopez has deprived Congress of very little 
power."); Nagel, supra note 6, at 661 ("Those who perceive in [the Lopez] decision much to 
fear or much to hope for are, I think, not only seeing Lopez and the Court's overall record 
inaccurately, but they are looking for the future in the wrong place."). 
89. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
90. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
91. As the Court's opinion explained: 
Adarand's claim arises under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that 
"No person shall . . .  be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
Although this Court has always understood that Clause to provide some measure of protec­
tion against arbitrary treatment by the Federal Government, it is not as explicit a guarantee 
of equal treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "No State shall . . .  
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (emphasis 
added). Our cases have accorded varying degrees of significance to the difference in the lan­
guage of those two Clauses. We think it necessary to revisit the issue here. 
Id. at 213 (emphasis added). 
92. Justice O'Connor cited three propositions that led her to the conclusion "that any 
person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the 
October 2001) Dissing Congress 101 
In dissent, Justice Stevens took aim at what he called the Court's 
"extraordinary proposition" "that Congress' institutional competence 
and constitutional authority entitles it to no greater deference when it 
enacts a program designed to foster equality than the deference due to 
a state legislature."93 He noted that the distinction between how the 
States and how Congress should be treated by the courts is explicitly 
embedded in the Constitution 
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same 
time it expressly limits the States. This is no accident. It represents our 
Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience throughout our sorry 
history of race relations, that the Federal Government must be the pri­
mary defender of racial minorities against the States, some of which may 
be inclined to oppress such minorities. A rule of "congruence" that ig­
nores a purposeful "incongruity" so fundamental to our system of gov­
ernment is unacceptable.94 
In response, Justice O'Connor stated: 
But requiring that Congress, like the States, enact racial classifications 
only when doing so is necessary to further a "compelling interest" does 
not contravene any principle of appropriate respect for a coequal branch 
of the Government. It is true that various Members of this Court have 
taken different views of the authority [Section j Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the problem of racial 
discrimination, and the extent to which courts should defer to Congress' 
exercise of that authority . . . .  We need not, and do not, address these dif­
ferences today.95 
Justice O'Connor's response, however, was not satisfactory at the 
structural level, because she offered no textual or historical support 
for the notion that the framers of the Constitution intended Congress 
and the States to abide by the same standards in the equality context. 
Congruence between the federal and state constitutional standards 
may have been convenient, but she failed to show how it was constitu­
tionally grounded.96 Rather than using the Eleventh Amendment to 
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment un­
der the strictest judicial scrutiny." Id. at 224. Those three propositions were: (1) skepticism 
("[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most search­
ing examination"), id. at 223; (2) consistency ("the standard of review under the Equal Pro­
tection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification"), id. at 224; and (3) congruence ("equal protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment"), id. at 224. For the 
derivation of the congruence proposition, she cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976), a 
case that involved the application of equal protection principles to the electoral process in a 
nonracial context. Id. at 224. 
93. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
94. Id. at 255. 
95. Id. at 230-31 .  
96. States are required to  abide by the principle of  equal protection through the explicit 
text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By contrast, Congress has by implication 
been understood as required to abide by the principle of equal protection through a broad 
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limit the nature of the relief that might be imposed on state govern­
ments, or the Tenth Amendment to limit how far Congress may in­
trude into the affairs of state government, the Adarand Court directly 
withdrew from Congress powers to enact legislation under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Adarand decision has had a major 
impact in the voting rights area, because such a strict standard of re­
view has undermined meaningful enforcement of the Voting Rights 
Act by the United States Department of Justice.97 
The next major indications of change in the separation of powers 
framework arose in 1996 and 1997 through the decisions in Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida98 and City of Boerne v. Flores.99 Although the 
Seminole Tribe case involved an obscure struggle over negotiations 
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, it resulted in a pathbreak­
ing determination. The Court held that, notwithstanding Congress's 
clear intention to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian 
Commerce Clause (which is akin to the Interstate Commerce Clause) 
does not grant Congress that power.100 This conclusion was inconsis­
tent with the Court's Pennsylvania v. Union Gas101 decision seven 
years earlier, in which it had held that the Interstate Commerce 
Clause granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immu­
nity. Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas, depriving Congress of an 
important tool for regulating the States. In the future, Congress would 
have to look outside the Commerce Clause when it wished to pass 
reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This implied requirement is 
particularly difficult to discern and apply, however, because Congress also has the explicit 
power to enforce the equality provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment through 
its Section 5 powers. For further discussion of Congress's role in the equal protection con­
text, see Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 662-64 (2000). 
97. See generally Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that nonminority appellants have stated 
a valid equal protection claim under strict scrutiny by alleging that the state adopted a ra­
cially segregated reapportionment scheme to comply with the Voting Rights Act). In Bush, 
Justice O'Connor wrote her own concurrence, emphasizing that compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act might constitute a compelling interest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny, but 
in each of these three cases she failed to find such an interest met. See generally Samuel 
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111  
HARV. L.  REV. 2276, 2276 (1998); Pamela S .  Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting ls Dif­
ferent, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1219 (1996). 
98. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
99. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
100. The Commerce Clause in full provides Congress with the power "to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
The Court also held in Seminole Tribe that the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), may not be used to enforce the statutory requirements against a state official. 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73. That ruling may ultimately prove highly significant in the re­
shaping of the relationship between the judicial and legislative branches, but discussion of 
that possibility is beyond the scope of this Article. 
101. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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legislation that subjected the States to suits for damages by private 
citizens. 
One presumptive source of authority was Section 5, because the 
Court had consistently approved civil rights legislation justified under 
that authority.102 The Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne, 
however, suggested that deferential review of Congress's work pursu­
ant to Section 5 was no longer the norm. Congress had enacted the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") of 1993 in direct re­
sponse to the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith.103 In 
Smith, the Court had held that neutral, generally applicable laws may 
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a com­
pelling governmental interest. Congress was unhappy with that deci­
sion and passed RFRA to "restore the compelling interest test . . .  and 
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion 
is substantially burdened."104 Both in the title of the statute and in the 
purpose section,105 Congress openly asserted that it wished to "re­
store" the constitutional law of free exercise to where that constitu­
tional standard had been before the Smith decision, in contravention 
of Congress's role as circumscribed beginning with Marbury v. 
Madison.106 
Given the unusual circumstances of RFRA, the Court could have 
ruled that Congress violated Marbury by attempting to dictate the 
meaning of the Constitution. Indeed, not one member of the Court 
concluded that Congress had the power to "restore" the law of free 
exercise by invoking its Section 5 powers.107 Even Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, who rarely conclude that Congress has exceeded its author­
ity, agreed that RFRA was unconstitutional. 1 08 
102. See Fizpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966) (discussed at supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text). 
103. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
104. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (1994)). 
105. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb(b)(l) (1994). 
106. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
107. Congress sought to justify RFRA under its Section 5 powers as permissible en­
forcement legislation. Nonetheless, no member of the Court disagreed with the proposition 
that the legislation was flatly inconsistent with Smith. Justice O'Connor dissented (with 
Justice Breyer) by arguing that Smith itself was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered. 
City of Boerne, 524 U.S. at 544-45. Justice Souter dissented separately, arguing that the writ 
of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted, and the case should be set down 
for reargument on the question of whether Smith was correctly decided. He, too, saw the 
decision in the case as hinging on the merit of the Smith decision. Id. at 565-66. 
108. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens joined the majority opinion; Justice Stevens also 
authored a separate opinion in which he concluded that RFRA violated the Establishment 
Clause. See id. at 536. (Stevens, J., concurring). Apart from relying on Marbury, the Court 
could have invalidated RFRA by following another, comparably cautious, mode of analysis 
under Section 5. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court had made clear that Section 5 confers 
upon Congress powers to enforce equal protection guarantees but not to "restrict, abrogate, 
or dilute these guarantees," or otherwise to act inconsistently with "the letter and spirit of 
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Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, however, did not merely 
hold that RFRA was unconstitutional in Marbury terms; it set forth a 
new framework for considering the constitutionality of Congress's ac­
tions under Section 5. For the first time since 1883, the Court ruled 
that Congress exceeded its Section 5 authority.109 Although the major­
ity's opinion in Boerne was loaded with qualifications and caveats,110 
this new framework imposed on Congress a much higher burden of 
proof in establishing the constitutionality of its actions under Section 
5. First, the Court emphasized the difference between "remedial" and 
"substantive" legislation, concluding that Congress could only enact 
legislation that reflects "proportionality or congruence between the 
means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.''1 1 1  It couched 
that distinction in terms that are deferential to Congress, yet, as future 
decisions reflect, the deferential language has turned out to be largely 
rhetorical. 1 1 2  
Second, and of particular relevance here, the Court emphasized 
the importance of a legislative record to support the need for the re­
medial legislation. Again, it framed the test in conventional terms, 
asking if Congress had used "reasonable means" to exercise its reme­
dial or preventive power.1 13 The application of this standard, however, 
was far more rigorous than it had been in prior cases. The Court 
chided Congress for producing a legislative record that "lacks exam­
ples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because 
of religious bigotry."114 Yet even the majority's own recitation of the 
legislative history reflects that Congress gave careful consideration to 
the constitution." 384 U.S. 641, 651 & n.10. It is possible to argue that Congress's Section 5 
powers, recognized in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents as "prohibiting a somewhat broader 
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text," 528 
U.S. 62, 81 (2000), do not apply to the same extent in the free exercise area, because the Es­
tablishment Clause acts as a ceiling on free exercise protection. For further discussion of this 
argument, see Colker, supra note 80. 
109. Not since the controversial decision in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in 
which the Court held that Congress lacked the constitutionality authority to regulate the pri­
vate sector under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, had the Court struck down 
civil rights legislation. The Adarand decision, although not involving traditional civil rights 
legislation, may have foreshadowed the willingness of the Court to invalidate legislative ac­
tion taken pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1 10. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens joined the Boerne majority opinion. Given their sub­
sequent positions in Section 5 cases, it is possible they did not appreciate how the opinion 
subtly created a basis for new limitations on Congress's powers. 
1 1 1. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. 
112. The majority said: "While the line between measures that remedy or prevent un­
constitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is 
not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the 
distinction exists and must be observed." Id. at 519-20. We discuss the phantom nature of 
this requirement at infra Part I I I .  
1 13. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at  529. 
1 14. Id. at 530. The examples were purportedly more than forty years old. Id. 
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the problem of religious discrimination before enacting legislation. 1 1 5  
While Congress may have overreached in fundamental terms by in ef­
fect declaring that the Court's constitutional interpretation was unlaw­
ful, the legislative record supporting RFRA was no weaker than the 
legislative record of other statutes that the Court had upheld under 
Section 5 in prior years. 
In a revealing statement, the Court noted that " [t]his lack of sup­
port in the legislative record, however, is not RFRA's most serious 
shortcoming."116 It would have been more appropriate for the Court 
not to list RFRA's legislative history as a shortcoming at all, but rather 
simply to conclude that RFRA exceeded Congress's enforcement 
authority. Instead, the Court started down the path toward what we 
describe as a phantom legislative history requirement - a require­
ment that the Court finds unmet irrespective of Congress's diligence. 
Thus, through decisions in two different areas of the law - Com­
merce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment - the 
Court has substantially altered the relationship between the courts and 
Congress. Beginning in 1995, a longstanding presumption of deference 
toward the work of Congress has been peeled away. 
II. CRYSTAL BALLS 
Although the new activist majority has often disdained legislative 
history when engaging in traditional statutory interpretation,1 17 it has 
made legislative history relevant when considering the constitutional­
ity of legislation under Section 5 and the Commerce Clause. As origi­
nally stated in the Commerce Clause context in Katzenbach v. 
McClung, the existence of legislative history that rationally supports 
an asserted burden on interstate commerce was supposed to put an 
end to the Court's own investigation into the question of whether 
Congress was entitled to regulate, because the Court would defer to 
Congress's findings. 1 18 While congressional hearings did not obviate 
the Court's responsibility to determine for itself whether a measure 
was constitutional, the Court was not requiring Congress to engage in 
substantial factfinding as part of its daily work before enacting legisla­
tion. Indeed, as recently as 1980, a lead opinion of the Court empha-
1 15. See id. at 530-31 (reviewing testimony by eleven witnesses at three congressional 
hearings concerning history of religious persecution in the United States, including accounts 
of autopsies performed on Jewish individuals and Hmong immigrants in violation of their 
religious beliefs, and descriptions of zoning regulations and historic preservation laws that 
have adverse effects on churches and synagogues). 
1 16. Id. at 531 .  The Court elaborated in the following paragraph, that "[r]egardless of 
the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legisla­
tion, if those terms are to have any meaning." Id. at 532. 
1 17. See infra Part JV. 
1 18. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. 
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sized that Congress "may legislate without compiling the kind of 'rec­
ord' appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative proceed­
ings."119 The decision whether to create a legislative record was the 
prerogative of Congress, not the courts. 
With its decisions in Lopez and City of Boerne, however, the Court 
began to suggest that, when considering a statute's constitutionality, it 
wanted to find evidence in the legislative history at the time of pas­
sage. In Lopez, the ·Court first made the boilerplate statement derived 
from McClung that "Congress normally is not required to make for­
mal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on inter­
state commerce."120 Yet the Court then emphasized the usefulness of 
such findings when "no such substantial effect was visible to the naked 
eye."121 One wonders why the Court should stop at what is obvious to 
the "naked eye." Moreover, in considering the visibility of an effect on 
commerce, the Lopez Court would not go beyond the legislative rec­
ord that was compiled by the enacting Congress. In particular, the 
Court refused to consider prior federal enactments or congressional 
findings on the subject of firearms regulations, because they did not 
speak to the precise statute before the Court.122 
Then, in City of Boerne, the Court invoked its somewhat amor­
phous distinction between remedial and substantive legislation to in­
crease the burden on Congress. Once again, the Court recited the tra­
ditional statement about deference to congressional factfinding.123 Yet 
the Boerne Court proceeded to rely on Congress's failure to identify 
specific, constitutionally cognizable misconduct by the States in the 
legislative history accompanying RFRA.124 
In cases following City of Boerne, the Court has engaged in 
broader examination of the legislative record to determine whether 
the enacting Congresses adequately justified their constitutional 
authority to regulate. 125 Not surprisingly, Congress has lacked a good 
enough crystal ball to have created the requisite, precise legislative 
histories. Although hints of this development can be found in Lopez 
and City of Boerne, it is far more obvious in Kimel v. Florida Board of 
119. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980). 
120. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995). 
121. Id. at 563. 
122. Id. 
123. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) ("All must acknowledge that Sec­
tion 5 is a 'positive grant of legislative power' to Congress . . . .  ") (citing Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 651 (1966)). 
124. Id. at 530-31. 
1 25. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
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Regents126 and United States v. Morrison.127 In each case, the Court 
sought and was unable to find support in the legislative record under a 
legal standard that was unknown at the time the statute was enacted. 
A. Kimel 
The issue in Kimel was whether Congress properly abrogated the 
States' sovereign immunity when it. subjected states to monetary dam­
ages suits by their employees as part of the 1974 amendments to the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA''). When Congress 
amended the ADEA in 1974, it could have thought that such action 
was permissible under the Commerce Clause given the 1968 decision 
in Maryland v. Wirtz 128 upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act as 
constitutionally regulating state employees under that clause. Because 
employment matters historically have been understood to affect inter­
state commerce substantially, Congress would not have paused to 
wonder whether the statute could be justified under the existing con­
stitutional test. Moreover, even if members of Congress had stopped 
to consider the constitutionality of authorizing private damages ac­
tions against the States, they would have seen no reason to pepper the 
legislative history with explanations of that justification. At most, a 
member of Congress who was familiar with the legal requirements of 
the time would have thought it important that one could find a justifi­
cation for Congress's actions, not that the record needed to support 
such justifications with detailed findings. 
Although members of Congress in 1974 might well have justified 
abrogating states' immunity from private damages actions in Com­
merce Clause terms, that justification was not available after Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida.129 Accordingly, the petitioners and the United States 
in Kimel relied on Section 5 as an alternative justification for 
Congress's extension of ADEA monetary liability to the States.130 The 
Court agreed that a Section 5 justification was available in theory, but 
then applied its "congruence and proportionality" test from City of 
126. 528 U.S. 62 (200 ). 
127. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
128. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
129. The Kimel Court took the Commerce Clause justification entirely off the table with 
the statement: "Under our firmly established precedent . . .  if the ADEA rests solely on 
Congress's Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot main­
tain their suits against their state employers." 528 U.S. at 79. Although the Court's reference 
to this precedent as "firmly established" is questionable, given the fractured nature of the 
Court's views in this area and the recent vintage of the Seminole Tribe decision, the Court 
correctly observed that the Commerce Clause justification was not available in the year 2000 
to justify the extension of ADEA damages liability to the States in 1974. 
130. See Brief for Petitioners, J. Daniel Kimel et al., at 21-44, Kimel (Nos. 98-791,  98-
796); Brief for the United States at 17-49, Kimel (Nos. 98-796, 98-791). 
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Boerne to determine whether the ADEA's extension to the States 
could be justified under Section 5.131 It concluded that the ADEA is 
"so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that 
it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, un­
constitutional behavior."132 
Despite this sweeping statement of unconstitutionality, the Court 
went on to note: 
That the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitu­
tional, while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our § 5 in­
quiry. Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful reme­
dies, and we have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting 
reasonably prophylactic legislation. Our task is to determine whether the 
ADEA is in fact just such an appropriate remedy or, instead, merely an 
attempt to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations with re­
spect to age discrimination. One means by which we have made such a 
determination in the past is by examining the legislative record containing 
the reasons for Congress' action.133 
The Court used the phrase "one means" to describe this inquiry, 
but it was, in fact, the only means used to assess whether ADEA ex­
tension was reasonably prophylactic legislation. The Court examined 
the ADEA legislative record to determine whether Congress had 
identified patterns or practices of age discrimination by state employ­
ers. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found no such evi­
dence had been presented in congressional hearings or elsewhere in 
the legislative history.134 Because Congress lacked a reasonable evi­
dentiary basis for believing prophylactic legislation was needed to ad­
dress States' misconduct, the ADEA was not a valid exercise of 
Congress's Section 5 powers. 
The Kimel Court's tone in examining the legislative history was 
deeply skeptical.135 The majority dismissed petitioners' arguments 
from the legislative record as no more than "isolated sentences" that 
were "cobble[d] together from a decade's worth of congressional re­
ports and floor debates."136 The Court concluded that the extension of 
the ADEA to millions of state government employees was "an unwar­
ranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem. "137 In deter-
131.  Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-81. 
1 32. Id. at 86 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)). 
133. Id. at 88 (emphasis added). 
134. Id. at 87-89. 
135. For related discussion of Kimel's approach toward Congress and its exercise of Sec­
tion 5 powers, see James J. Brudney, The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law: Labor 
and Employment Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1999-2000 Term, 16 LAB. LAW. 151, 170-
79 (2000). 
136. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90. 
137. Id. at 89. 
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mining that age discrimination by state employers in the early 1970s 
was "perhaps inconsequential," the Court expressly challenged a key 
legislative proponent's floor statements describing employment dis­
crimination against the elderly,138 and a California legislative study 
documenting age discrimination by public agencies. 139 
Kimel's skeptical scrutiny of the ADEA legislative record signals a 
dramatic change in perspective. The Court in prior decades had sus­
tained Section 5 legislation without expecting Congress to produce the 
kind of legislative findings demanded in Kimel.140 Even in City of 
Boerne, where Congress's creation of new substantive rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment triggered a closer review of the RFRA legis­
lative record, the Court noted that legislative findings are not typically 
required in the Section 5 setting.141 
The 1974 legislative record admittedly contains few detailed find­
ings of arbitrary age discrimination by state employers. That, however, 
is hardly surprising: we have shown that the Court's Section 5 deci­
sions at the time did not encourage - much less demand - the crea­
tion of such a record. Further, the ADEA extension was but a small 
part of a larger statute dealing with wage and hour matters.142 In this 
regard, the ADEA legislative record addressing unconstitutional dis­
crimination by state employers is at least comparable to the record 
made two years earlier that supported extending Title VII's ban on 
gender discrimination to the States.143 
138. See id. (questioning validity of Senator Bentsen's statements on the floor that state 
and local governments were discriminating against the elderly in their employment prac­
tices). 
139. See id. (questioning findings on age discrimination in public agencies reported to 
the House in a study commissioned by California legislature). 
140. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 (1980) (upholding Congress's power to re­
quire states to pay attorneys' fees in certain circumstances with no reference to congres­
sional findings of a pattern of unconstitutional state conduct); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U.S. 641, 652-56, 669 & n.9 (1966) (upholding congressional invalidation of state statutes that 
required literacy in English as a condition of voting, based on hypothesized discrimination 
against Spanish-speaking minority which dissent noted was without any support in legislative 
record). 
141. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531-32 (1997). 
142. See Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a) (1)-(4), 88 Stat 55, 78-80 (1974) (featuring twenty­
nine sections, of which twenty-eight address FLSA wage and hour issues). Indeed, the legis­
lative history suggests that the omission of government workers from the ADEA seven years 
earlier was due primarily to the fact that most government employees were not covered by 
the FLSA at that time, and responsibility for ADEA enforcement was to be carried out by 
the same agency personnel who enforce the FLSA. See SEN. REP. No. 93-690, at 55 (1974). 
143. Compare, e.g. , Hearings on H.R. 3651 et al. Before the General Subcommittee on 
Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 166-69 (1967) (re­
printing summary of findings from study commissioned by California legislature that recites 
specific examples of arbitrary and intentional age discrimination by government employers), 
with Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 468-69 (1971) (reprinting statement of the 
League of Women Voters, asserting that " [p]ersistent and distinct [sex] discriminatory prac­
tices have been found in state and local personnel systems"). See generally H. R. REP. No. 
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The absence of a detailed record for fifty States as employers does 
not mean Congress acted without rational foundation in 1974. The 
voluminous legislative findings of arbitrary discrimination by private 
employers were less than a decade old when Congress extended cov­
erage to the States, and half the States still had no age discrimination 
laws at all for public employers.144 The Court could have developed a 
set of reasonable arguments to justify the 1974 extension to state em­
ployees based in part on the widespread evidence available to 
Congress about private sector age discrimination. Yet the Court in 
Kimel asserted that the ADEA private sector findings were simply ir­
relevant to the posited existence of arbitrary discrimination by state 
employers.145 
This cursory dismissal of a detailed legislative record shows again 
how far the newly activist Court has traveled. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
when Congress enacted the ADEA and extended its protections to 
public employees, arbitrary age discrimination was a pervasive pres­
ence in the white collar workforce, principally among professionals, 
managers, and bureaucrats.146 These occupational categories are 
92-238 (1971) (containing no discussion of state employers engaging in sex discrimination); 
1 17 CONG. REC. 31958-85, 32088-114 (1971) (containing no discussion in House floor debate 
of state employers engaging in sex discrimination); 118 CONG. REC. 4907-49 (1972) (con­
taining no discussion in Senate floor debate of state employers engaging in sex discrimina­
tion). See also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977) (discussing 
minimal legislative record that accompanied 1972 extension of Title VII to include ban on 
religious discrimination). 
144. See Brief for Respondents appendix at la-25a, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents. 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (Nos. 98-791, 98-796) (reporting that twenty-four States had no age discrimi­
nation laws applicable to public employers when Congress extended the ADEA). 
145. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90-91 (dismissing argument that Congress found substantial age 
discrimination in private sector as "beside the point" and "doubt[ing] whether the findings 
Congress did make with respect to the private sector could be extrapolated to support a 
finding of unconstitutional age discrimination in the public sector"). 
146. See generally Employment Problems of Older Workers: Hearings on H.R. 274 et 
al., Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., (1965) (containing 
nine days of testimony and submissions); Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcom­
mittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., (1967) 
(containing three days of testimony and submissions); Hearings on H.R. 3651 et al., Before 
the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 
90th Cong. (1967) (containing twelve days of testimony and submissions); The Older 
American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor to 
the Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 90-
805, at 2 (1967) (discussing scope of congressional concern for problems of age discrimina­
tion in employment). ADEA litigation typically involved mid-level professionals, salesmen, 
and managers. See, e.g. , United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (involving airline 
pilot); Price v. Md. Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977) (involving insurance salesman); 
Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in 
part, and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979) (involving clothing designer); Coates v. 
Nat'! Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977) (involving engineer). Union 
strength in the private sector meant that collectively bargained seniority systems provided 
substantial protections to millions of older blue collar employees. 
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equally if  not more prevalent for public employers,147 and it would 
surely have been reasonable for Congress to conclude that state em­
ployers mistreated their older workers in many of the same ways as 
private employers. 
It is worth emphasizing the crystal ball nature of the Court's deci­
sion. The 1974 Congress was acting pursuant to a settled understand­
ing under which civil rights legislation could be justified based on both 
Section 5 and the Commerce Clause. There simply was no reason in 
1974 to generate a lengthy legislative record demonstrating that state 
and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against 
their employees on the basis of age. The fact that it took the Court 
twenty-six years to evolve to the position that the ADEA was uncon­
stitutional in subjecting states to monetary damages suits by their em­
ployees says more about ideological changes on the Supreme Court 
than "attitudinal" changes in Congress. 
As a policymaking body, Congress legislates repeatedly in areas of 
national concern such as age discrimination in employment. Commit­
tees and members draw on their institutional and individual experi­
ences to justify more efficient lawmaking without resorting to redun­
dant hearings or extended debate. To regard the brief 1974 legislative 
history as the entire "record" underlying the ADEA's extension "is 
essentially . . .  [to] treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court," 
and thereby to "erect an artificial barrier to full understanding of the 
legislative process."148 By creating a rigid and narrow requirement for 
how Congress must justify ADEA extension in the 1974 legislative re­
cord, the Court required a degree of legislative omniscience that is 
highly troubling as a matter of constitutional discourse between the 
branches. 
B. Morrison 
The crystal ball methodology is also apparent in Morrison. The is­
sue in Morrison was the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981 , which 
provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated 
violence. This provision is part of the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994, enacted by Congress a year before the Supreme Court decided 
147. See, e.g. , EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (involving mid-level manager in 
state agency); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving public school 
teacher). In 1979, state and local governments employed nearly 2.8 million administrators, 
professionals, technicians, paraprofessionals, and office/clerical workers, comprising 60.9% 
of their combined workforce. In 1997, these five categories of white collar workers com­
prised 63.3% of the state and local government workforce, a total of 3.3 million employees. 
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
U NITED STATES 1999, at 339 (119th ed. 1999); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. D EP'T OF 
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1981, at 308 (102d ed. 1981). 
148. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell J. concurring). 
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Lopez. Christy Brzonkala brought suit against Antonio Morrison and 
James Crawford after university officials took no punitive action 
against the men despite allegations that they had raped her and used 
sexually offensive language. The Fourth Circuit, on a divided vote en 
bane, held that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact 
§ 13981 's civil remedy under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 149 
The Supreme Court began its investigation of the constitutionality 
of § 13981 with boilerplate language about deference to Congress.150 
Nonetheless, the Court soon turned to an excerpt from the decision in 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.151 that it had also quoted in 
Lopez: The interstate commerce power should not be "extended so as 
to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote 
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effec­
tively obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is 
local and create a completely centralized government."152 That quota­
tion, however, ignores the thrust of the opinion in Jones & Laughlin, 
which was pivotal in returning the Court to its posture of deference to 
congressional action. The Jones & Laughlin Court had found two 
prior decisions not to be "controlling" authority, in order to conclude 
that Congress had acted lawfully when it created a comprehensive na­
tional system for regulating labor-management relations. The Court's 
holding there was more consistent with a different statement in its 
majority opinion - "The fundamental principle is that the power to 
regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' 
for 'its protection and advancement' "153 - than with the minor caveat 
quoted by the Court in both Lopez and Morrison. Yet, the Morrison 
Court amplified its rationale from Lopez by making the Court, not 
Congress, the appropriate authority to determine what kind of legisla­
tion is needed to protect the national interest. 
149. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (6-4 
decision in which four members of the court joined Judge Luttig's opinion, Judge Neimeyer 
concurred separately, and three members joined Judge Motz's dissent). Unlike Lopez, the 
Morrison case dealt with Congress's authority to enact a civil rather than a criminal remedy. 
Section 13981(a) stated that Congress had authority to enact this provision under Section 5 
and the Commerce Clause. For a thoughtful discussion of the Morrison Court's Section 5 
holding in more traditional federalism terms, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, 
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 
110 YALE L.J. 441, 473-86 (2000). 
150. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Due respect for the decisions 
of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enact­
ment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."). 
151 .  301 U.S. 1 ,  37 (1937). 
152. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 
(1995) (quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37)). 
153. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 
557, 564 (1870)). 
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Like the 1974 Congress extending ADEA coverage to public em­
ployment, the 1994 Congress would have had little reason to doubt the 
constitutionality of its work in creating for women a private right of 
action against perpetrators of violence. The Court, however, held 
§ 13981 to the test that it formulated in Lopez; indeed, it expanded the 
nature of that test. First, the Court asserted that there must be proof 
that the regulated activity was economic in character and recast its 
prior decisions under that previously unannounced principle.154 Sec­
ond, the Court noted, as it had in Lopez for the first time, that a juris­
dictional element - such as a requirement that the gun crossed state 
boundaries in interstate commerce - may establish that Congress 
acted pursuant to its commerce powers.155 The 1994 Congress had no 
reason to foresee that an explicit jurisdictional element might be suffi­
cient to establish valid Commerce Clause authority; thus, that element 
was lacking from the legislation. Finally, the Court observed that "ex­
press congressional findings" in the legislative history could demon­
strate constitutionality.156 It repeated the Lopez "naked eye" standard: 
that legislative findings can save legislation when the effect on inter­
state commerce is not visible to the naked eye.157 
As in Kimel, the Morrison Court treated Congress like a lower 
court, refusing to extrapolate from its findings to fit the proper consti­
tutional standard. The legislative record contained substantial evi­
dence of unconstitutional gender bias in twenty-one States. 1 58 The 
Court expressed concern that such findings, from only twenty-one of 
the fifty States, were not sufficient as evidence of a national prob­
lem.159 
154. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-11. See infra text accompanying notes 162-166 for further 
discussion of this point. 
155. Id. at 611-12. Some prior laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, such as 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, had included a jurisdictional requirement. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994) ("Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a 
place of public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect 
commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action."). Others, 
however, had not, such as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994). 
156. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (quoting Brief for the 
United States at 5-6, Lopez (No. 93-1260))). 
157. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563). 
158. Id. at 629-31 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Passage of the Act in 1994 was preceded by 
four years of hearings, which included testimony from physicians and law professors; from 
survivors of rape and domestic violence; and from representatives of state law enforcement 
and private business. The record includes reports on gender bias from task forces in 21 
States, and we have the benefit of specific factual findings in the eight separate Reports is­
sued by Congress and its committees over the long course leading to enactment."). 
159. Id. at 626 (observing that "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimi­
nation against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all states, or even 
most states"); see id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to documented constitutional 
violations by twenty-one States, adding "(t]he record nowhere reveals a congressional find­
ing that the problem 'does not exist' elsewhere."). 
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Unlike Lopez, the Court was not faced with an empty congres­
sional record in Morrison. As the Court acknowledged, there was evi­
dence of the "serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on 
victims and their families."160 Congress found that gender-motivated 
violence affected interstate commerce: 
[B]y deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging 
in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, 
and in places involved in interstate commerce . . .  [,] by diminishing na­
tional productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing 
the supply of and demand for interstate products.161 
This evidence, however, was not the right sort of evidence because 
it followed the "but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of 
violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon interstate com­
merce."162 The Court criticized Congress's attempt at record building 
as flowing from a flawed "method of reasoning."163 
Although the Morrison Court found this evidence unworthy, it was 
arguably precisely the type of evidence approved by the Court in the 
past. In Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court deferred to a legislative 
record that included anecdotal discussion of the costs associated with 
racial segregation as well as evidence regarding race-based differen­
tials in family expenditures based on the reduced mobility of black 
families. 164 Congress in 1994 had compiled a far weightier record iden-
160. Id. at 614. 
1 61 .  H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. 
Nor was the evidence of a national problem limited to the mathematical minority of states 
referred to by the Court above. For instance, the record included a letter signed by the at­
torneys-general from thirty-eight states, requesting Congress to enact VA WA because "the 
problem of violence against women is a national one, requiring federal attention." See Letter 
from Robert Abrams et al., Attorney General of New York, to Jack Brooks, Chair House 
Judiciary Committee, reprinted in Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judici­
ary, 103d Cong. 34-36 (1993). 
1 62. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. Congress could perhaps have done a more artful job in 
explaining why § 13981 and its national antidiscrimination protections were appropriate 
when it created its legislative record. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of 
the Commerce Clause: Congressional Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1206, 1214 (1998) (arguing that there is "a loss in our failure to articulate national val­
ues other than commerce" in judicial review of congressional action). Even under Professor 
Merritt's approach, the Court could offer instructions to Congress on what type of evidence 
might support its authority to regulate social problems. The Court, however, did not walk 
down that path. Instead, it took away the power from Congress altogether with the assertion 
that these matters "can be settled finally only by this Court," seemingly without opportunity 
for input from Congress. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (internal citation omitted). 
163. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
164. See Civil Rights - Public Accommodations, Hearings on S. 1 732 Before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., App. V, pp. 1383-1387 (1963) (documenting "illustra­
tive examples, as reported in newspapers and periodicals, of economic impact resulting from 
resistance to segregation practices"); H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 9-10 (1963) (additional 
views on H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch, Hon. John V. Lindsay, Hon. William T. 
Cahill, Hon. Garner E. Shriver, Hon. Clark MacGregor, Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Hon. 
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tifying (in anecdotal and systemic terms) the costs associated with 
gender-based violence, including costs stemming from reduced mobil­
ity by women.165 
The Court rewrote the Commerce Clause test from a "substantial 
effect on interstate commerce" to an "economic activity" test. The 
Court did so by reexamining and even reshaping the language and 
holding in Lopez, emphasizing that the economic aspect of the regu­
lated activity was central to holdings in prior decisions that Congress 
had not exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.166 Congress 
thought it needed to document the effect on interstate commerce 
when it really needed to document that the activity being regulated 
was economic in nature. Once again, this is a crystal ball problem -
the Court not deferring to its coequal branch because the enacting 
Congress had failed to create a legislative record that could satisfy a 
hitherto unannounced legal standard. 
C. Implications 
The Court's approach represents a serious challenge to the way 
Congress legislates. The Court is in effect directing Congress to hold 
focused hearings and to gather comprehensive evidence that will pro­
vide ample support for the existence of a national problem address­
able under Congress's enumerated powers. The Court's new height­
ened review of the legislative record has transformed Congress's role 
James E. Bromwell) (documenting the cost of an illustrative trip from Washington, D.C., to 
Miami, Florida, and from Washington, D.C., to New Orleans, Louisiana, showing location of 
hotel-motel accommodations of "reasonable" quality readily available to Negroes); H.R. 
Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2 at tbl. II (documenting the average family expenditure for admissions, 
food eaten away from home, and automobile operations, for three income classes, large, 
northern and southern cities, by race, 1950). 
165. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631-33 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reciting results from nu­
merous studies, including a sharp reduction in women participating in commercial activities 
alone in evening due to fear of rape). 
166. Lopez seemed to view the substantial effects test as key. See United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) ("We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case 
law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially 
affects' interstate commerce." (emphasis added)). But in Morrison, the Court stated that 
"the pattern of analysis is clear . . .  Where economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained." 529 U.S. at 610 (emphasis 
added). By contrast, the Court noted that when the regulated activity is noneconomic in 
character, it is unlikely to find that Congress acted within its commerce powers. Hence, "a 
fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue 
was central to our decision in that case . . . .  Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case law 
demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate 
activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in 
question has been some sort of economic endeavor." Id. at 610; see A. Christopher Bryant & 
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New 'On the Record' 
Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 341-44 (2001) (discuss­
ing how Morrison decision converted Lopez into an economic activity test). 
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from a coequal branch warranting judicial deference to an entity 
charged with extensive factfinding responsibilities. 
One possible response, of course, is to ask what is so bad about 
such a dynamic between the branches. Since Lopez was decided, a 
number of legal scholars have maintained that the requirement of 
adequate legislative findings can promote more thoughtful national 
laws and enhance interbranch cooperation.167 " [I]f carefully applied 
and thoughtfully limited, [the Lopez decision] could promote a 
meaningful dialogue between judiciary and legislature concerning just 
where the difficult-to-draw lines should exist concerning important 
constitutional values of personal equality and federalism."168 
Such arguments presuppose a basic judicial faith in the enterprise 
of building a legislative record. By emphasizing the importance of de­
tailed and comprehensive legislative history as a justification for con­
gressional power, the Court presumably seeks to add new value to the 
exchanges between itself and Congress on public policy matters and to 
improve the quality of those federal laws that are enacted by Congress 
as appropriate national solutions. The fact that the Court has found 
Congress's efforts thus far uniformly unsatisfactory could simply mean 
that Congress must do more to adapt to· the new rigor associated with 
legislative record building. Yet it is also possible that the Court's crys­
tal ball approach reflects a different, less constructive attitude regard­
ing Congress and its methods of legislating. 
While we agree that it is generally a positive development for 
Congress to create a record in support of legislation, we do not believe 
the Court should be micromanaging when and how that record is de­
veloped.169 It is not enough to insist that the Court intrude into 
167. See, e.g. Philip P. Frickey, Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional 
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 697 (1996); Barry 
Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signs: A Positive Political Reading of United 
States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 760 (1996); Jackson, supra note 79, at 2237, 
2240; Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of 
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 947 (1999). These proceduralist arguments, often advanced by 
advocates of a liberal legal process approach (Frickey, Friedman, Jackson), are distinct from 
substantive arguments that the Court's new conservatism is right on the merits. See, e.g. , 
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. 
Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 746 (1996). 
168. Frickey, supra note 167, at 729; see also Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an 
Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 734 
(1996) ("Required findings represent a less intrusive step than full-fledged review, and -
despite the drawbacks - may facilitate a collaborative effort to develop constitutional prin­
ciples in contexts in which independent judicial rules are normatively unattractive."). 
169. The Constitution, of course, does require Congress to keep a record of its pro­
ceedings. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceed­
ings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment 
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question 
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal."). Were 
Congress to fail to comply with that requirement entirely, we would agree that intervention 
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Congress's affairs in a way that is "carefully applied and thoughtfully 
limited. "170 The kind of intrusion that began in Lopez is inherently 
problematic, because telling Congress how to perform its information­
gathering functions misunderstands and subverts the legislative pro­
cess in four significant ways. 
1. The Rich Informality of Information-Gathering 
The Court's approach fails to appreciate the skill and sophistica­
tion that Congress brings to the information-gathering process. 
Congress educates itself not just through structured record evidence 
but through a range of informal contacts - including local meetings 
with constituents, ex parte contacts between members (or staff) and 
lobbyists, and exchanges with executive branch representatives.171 This 
institutional virtue, the capacity to gather and evaluate information in 
both structured and informal settings, contributes to a distinctive Sec­
tion 5 role for Congress. When it enacted the ADEA, Congress 
amassed a powerful record illustrating the pervasive nature of age­
based stereotypes and discriminatory generalizations in the American 
workplace.172 Its statutory response, which seeks to prohibit and deter 
such arbitrary employer conduct, applies in the public sector not only 
to laws enacted by state legislatures but also to more individualized 
and even routine decisionmaking by personnel managers, supervisors 
and government agencies.173 More than three decades after the 
is appropriate. But if Congress does not regulate in the area of suspect classes or fundamen­
tal rights, if it keeps a record of its proceedings, and if the record discloses a rational basis for 
legislative action, then we believe the Court should have little further role in monitoring the 
constitutional quality or quantity of that record. 
170. Frickey, supra note 167, at 729. 
171. See JOSEPH M. B ESETIE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: D ELIBERATIVE 
D EMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 50-51 ,  152, 178 (1994) (discussing 
importance of informal information-sharing by lobbyists and executive branch officials); 
WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. 0GUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 327-28 
(9th ed. 1997) (reporting that most lobbyists regard personal presentation of their issue to a 
single legislator as more effective than testifying at committee hearing); Allen Schick, In­
formed Legislation: Policy Research Versus Ordinary Knowledge, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER 
AND THE CONGRESS 99 (William H. Robinson & Clay H. Wellborn eds., 1991) (observing 
that "advice and ideas flow in [to Congress] from diverse sources" including constituent 
complaints, local news items and editorials, government agency reports, and private meet­
ings with lobbyists and others who have privileged access, as well as expert testimony at 
committee hearings, and that "[a]ll these sources are grist for the legislative mill"); see also 
Bryant & Simeone, supra note 166, at 384-87 (describing Congress's less formal information­
gathering channels, and explaining that "absent circumstances indicating corruption or brib­
ery, these kinds of off-the-record communications are not only legally permissible but consti­
tutionally protected"). 
172. See supra note 146 (citing to extensive legislative record). 
173. See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Johnson v. Mayor & City Council, 637 F. Supp. 903, 907 (D. Md. 1986). State legislative rules 
sanctioning the arbitrariness of mandatory retirement have survived rational basis review, 
but the Equal Protection Clause need not as a result permit individual state employers to 
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ADEA's enactment, common sense and social science research sup­
port Congress's initial conclusions that arbitrary stereotypes and gen­
eralizations - not hostile or negative feelings towards older people -
are at the root of unequal treatment in the workplace.174 The Court in 
Kimel was unwilling to accord meaningful recognition to Congress's 
special legislative competence in identifying this threat to equality and 
then acting to limit its consequences. 
The recent Garrett decision highlights the Court's unwillingness to 
recognize or respect how Congress educates itself about matters of 
public concern. In developing comprehensive legislation to protect in­
dividuals with disabilities from public and private discrimination, 
Congress relied not only on extensive direct testimony and decades of 
prior legislative experience regulating on this same subject, 175 but also 
on a Task Force that it created specifically to assess the need for new 
national disability discrimination legislation.176 Yet when it concluded 
that Congress did not adequately document the existence of disability 
discrimination in state employment, the Court questioned the rele­
vance of the evidence compiled from all fifty States by this Task Force, 
because the evidence of disparate treatment by state officials was 
submitted to the Task Force rather than directly to Congress.177 In ad­
dition, the Task Force and various Congressional committees collected 
evidence about discrimination by cities and counties as well as states. 
The Court, however, refused to extrapolate from this evidence of dis­
crimination by units of local government, because principles of sover­
eign immunity do not apply to these units of local government.178 
At the time it enacted the ADA, Congress had little reason to 
foresee any constitutional requirement for detailed record building, 
given that Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne were six or more years in 
the future. But even if it had anticipated a need for more extensive 
evidentiary support, Congress in 1990 could not possibly have fore-
invoke such stereotypes and generalizations whenever they fix terms and conditions of em­
ployment for older workers. 
174. See Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where 
It's Been, Where It ls Today, Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 618-20, 677-84 
(1997). See generally Linda H. Krieger, The Contents of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 
(1995); Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Discrimination: Research Agenda for the 
Twenty-First Century, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 319 (2000). 
175. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 976-77, at Appendices A and B (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
(listing thirteen congressional hearings on ADA during lOlst Congress (1989-90) and nine 
prior federal statutes, enacted between 1948 and 1988, addressing discrimination against in­
dividuals with disabilities by public and private entities). 
176. See id. at 977-93, Appendix C (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing submissions made to 
Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities by individuals and 
organizations from fifty States). 
177. Id. at 966. 
178. Id. at 965. 
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seen that its historic methods of educating itself outside the formalities 
of the hearing room, or its reliance on evidence of discrimination en­
gaged in by closely analogous government actors at the local level, 
would be excluded from consideration when that record was being re­
viewed. 
2. Political Accountability 
The Court's approach is further flawed in that it overlooks the im­
portant democracy-based aspects of information gathering. When 
Congress builds a legislative record in the context of its political rela­
tionship to the electorate, it is not only (or even primarily) seeking to 
compile an evidentiary foundation for purposes of judicial review. In 
addition, Congress seeks to inform the public (and key interested sub­
groups), thereby helping to shape public discourse. 1 79 It also tries to re­
spond to agendas promoted by these same interest groups, thereby re­
acting constructively and responsibly to the problems that groups 
identify. There are, in short, political dimensions when members of 
Congress promote, or oppose, a given legislative proposal. The busi­
ness of trying both to influence and to anticipate the public makes for 
messy and unpredictable legislative history. At the same time, this dy­
namic and regularly recorded tension between Congress and its con­
stituencies contributes importantly to the legitimacy of the lawmaking 
process, and helps explain the presumption of judicial deference to the 
final product. The Court's insistence on a type of pristine "substantial 
evidence" approach slights another of Congress's distinctive institu­
tional virtues - the politically accountable nature of its record build­
ing enterprise. 
This fact - that congressional record building leading to legisla­
tive enforcement is democratic whereas judicial review, especially 
strict scrutiny review of statutes, is the opposite180 - points toward an 
additional weakness in the Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence. 
When the Court in earlier ADEA decisions eschewed heightened 
179. See, e.g., BESETIE, supra note 171, at 57-63 (discussing importance of bargaining 
among members and interested groups as factor in congressional policymaking); id at 236-45 
(discussing use of political rhetoric as form of civic instruction in development of delibera­
tive majorities); KEEFE & 0GUL, THE AMERICAN LEG ISLATIVE PROCESS 339-40 (8th ed. 
1993) (discussing ways in which members of Congress influence lobbyists on policy matters); 
Bryant & Simeone, supra note 166, at 384, 387-88 (discussing the informing function of 
Congress). 
180. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971 ) (contrasting legislature's 
"broad discretion to classify" under "traditional equal protection principles" with the judici­
ary's closer scrutiny of laws that classify based on alienage); United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that "prejudice against discrete and insular mi­
norities (may] tend[] seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and . . .  may (therefore] call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry"). 
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scrutiny and upheld statutes that mandatorily retired police officers, 
judges, and foreign service employees, it was effectively deferring to 
legislative limits placed on groups with adequate access to the political 
process.181 This deference reflected in part the Court's understanding 
that its own role under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment182 is 
fundamentally antidemocratic and should be invoked with caution. 
It is quite another matter, however, for the Court to apply such 
reservations to Congress's politically accountable role under Section 5. 
Yet that is what the Kimel Court in essence did by prohibiting 
Congress from authorizing private damages actions to prevent or deter 
arbitrary state conduct against older persons who are not sufficiently 
"discrete and insular" to warrant strict scrutiny protection from the 
judiciary. In contrast to the Court, Congress is not an unaccountable 
"superlegislature"183 when it engages in broad-based factfinding re­
garding the existence of arbitrary age discrimination in the national 
workplace. Assuming that evidence of discrimination and lack of po­
litical access are not sufficiently stark to warrant heightened scrutiny 
under Section 1, it should not follow that Congress is precluded consti­
tutionally from extending important protection against government 
discrimination under Section 5 .  
3 .  Opportunity Costs 
Redirecting Congress's way of doing business also imposes sub­
stantial opportunity costs on the legislative enterprise. Enactment of 
federal legislation is a complex process that requires investing consid­
erable institutional resources and negotiating politically sensitive in­
ternal procedures. The implicit message in the Court's crystal ball ap­
proach is that Congress should simply do things better next time. Such 
a message, however, fails to acknowledge how resource-intensive the 
next time is likely to be. Consider, for example, how often important 
substantive provisions are enacted as part of larger bills under consid­
eration by Congress. The Violence Against Women Act and the Gun­
Free School Zones Act each were part of omnibus crime bills. Simi­
larly, the extension of the ADEA to the States was part of a much 
larger revision of the FLSA in 1974. It is highly unlikely that extensive 
hearings and lengthy reports will be produced on every aspect of such 
181. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 498 U.S. 1079 (1991) (state judges); Vance v. Bradley 440 
U.S. 93 (1979) (foreign service employees); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) 
(police officers). 
182. Section 1 provides in part: "No State shall . . .  deny to any person within its jurisdic­
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 .  
183. The term "superlegislature" was used by Justice Harlan i n  expressing concern 
about the Court's extension of its Section 1 authority. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Post & Siegel, supra note 149, at 463-64 (discussing 
tensions between roles of Court and Congress under Fourteenth Amendment). 
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large bills. Guided by its sense of which provisions are especially com­
plicated or controversial, Congress makes decisions about how to allo­
cate its limited resources. With no strong outcry from the minority 
party that any of these measures unconstitutionally impinges on states' 
sovereignty, one should hardly expect that Congress will devote exten­
sive resources to documenting their constitutionality. Yet the Court 
discusses each measure as if Congress's sole focus during legislative 
debate were on these discrete provisions embedded in larger pieces of 
legislation. 
By insisting that Congress take more time to build a lower court or 
agency-type record in Section 5 and Commerce Clause settings, the 
Court restricts the amount of other legislative work that Congress can 
accomplish.184 That structural constraint on Congress's legislative ca­
pacity may be viewed as a positive policy development by some, but it 
is not policy-neutral. The Court's effort to dictate, and thereby to re­
strict, Congress's agenda is a further manifestation of disrespect. 
4. Normative Ramifications 
Finally, and implicit in our descriptive account of the Court's in­
sensitivity to the nature of congressional operations, this crystal ball 
approach raises larger normative issues. As a general matter, both liti­
gants and citizens planning future conduct under our rule-of-law re­
gime are remitted to the crystal ball due to the possibility that a court 
will reverse or modify a prior interpretation after they have acted. 
Congress, historically and institutionally, has enjoyed a different status 
when its actions are subjected to judicial review. The legislation 
Congress enacts is presumed to be legitimate as the product of a co­
equal branch that formulates national policy under independent 
sources of constitutional law. For private parties, the crystal ball 
problem would be solved in theory if the Court's decisions were not 
retroactive. That result, however, would not address the problem of 
judicially invalidated exercises of congressional authority. The Court's 
changing rules do not simply adjust the prospective behavior of pri­
vate individuals; they erode the processes and powers of a constitu­
tional partner. 
It is a commonplace to observe that legislatures and courts make 
law in quite different, though comparably legitimate, ways. While the 
1 84. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of 
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1994) (maintaining that 
"the opportunities for Congress to act are limited in predictable ways by the finite quantity 
of temporal and political resources and by substantial logistical and procedural con­
straints . . .  [and) in unpredictable ways by the ebb and flow of public attention, interest 
group commitment, and intensity of member preferences[, the result being that) when 
Congress devotes more time to one legislative item, it sacrifices the opportunity to address 
other items on the legislative agenda"). 
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Court responds only to discrete cases or controversies, Congress plays 
a more proactive role on a broad policymaking stage. In fulfilling its 
legislative responsibilities, Congress relies on a special institutional 
competence that stems in important respects from being uncon­
strained by the agendas or evidentiary presentations of individual liti­
gants. As indicated above, Congress has the capacity to recognize and 
act upon "legislative facts,"185 including policy-related facts that are 
not part of any formal record, and also to consider a range of politi­
cally sensitive enforcement options and techniques in its effort to pro­
duce an effective accommodation of competing interests.186 These 
strategies reflect Congress's more general ability to draw upon the 
extra-record knowledge, experience, and judgment of its collective 
membership as the foundation for legislative action.187 
In its Section 5 and Commerce Clause decisions, the Rehnquist 
Court has effectively sought to reshape these lawmaking processes by 
imposing an "adjudicatory fact"188 model based on its own institutional 
experiences. Traditionally, the Court has been attentive to Congress's 
expertise and judgment in perceiving and reporting the pervasiveness 
of discriminatory practices or the substantiality of interstate commerce 
effects. By contrast, the level of precision and detail in the formal leg­
islative record that the current Court requires is more akin to the fac­
tual predicate needed to support a class action claim for constitutional 
relief. Even if it were a roadmap to constitutional validation for future 
statutes, this new approach would raise serious separation of powers 
concerns. In undervaluing, if not ignoring, essential elements of the 
legislative enterprise, the Court's approach cannot help but impede 
Congress's ability to fulfill its distinct responsibilities. 
In the end, the Court in Kimel and Garrett demanded that 
Congress prove something to justify its exercise of Section 5 powers 
against the States, a considerable departure from expectations of 
185. See generally Kenneth Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Admin­
istrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942) (distinguishing between "legislative 
facts," which "inform . . .  legislative judgment . . .  [when an agency] wrestles with a question 
of Jaw or policy" and "adjudicative facts," which "concern only the parties to a particular 
case"). 
186. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 
551-58 (1988) (discussing the distinctive institutional qualities of courts and legislatures, and 
emphasizing that legislatures are better able than courts to control their own agendas, to in­
vestigate issues in detail, to develop imaginative remedies, and to monitor results and revise 
solutions). 
187. See Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: Constillltional 
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 9 1 ,  105 (1966) (dis­
cussing distinctive legislative capacity to act on basis of members' expertise and experience 
without relying on formal record evidence). 
188. See Davis, supra note 185. See generally William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, 
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001 ) (critiquing Court's reliance 
on concept of a "legislative record" in light of administrative law principles). 
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Congress under the civil rights cases of the 1960s and 1970s. 189 Indeed, 
the earlier decisions suggest both that Congress should play a positive 
role in strengthening the antidiscrimination norms of the Fourteenth 
Amendment190 and that Congress's legislative efforts can support the 
Court's own evolving approach to understanding and enforcing those 
norms outside the racial setting.191 The Court in the last decade has 
largely abandoned this deferential stance, replacing it with a more 
constrained vision in which Congressional factfinding and support for 
antidiscrimination laws are subject to searching, skeptical review. 
Congress's unsurprising inability to keep pace with such a remarkable 
change in perspective has produced a troubling shift in the balance of 
power between the branches. 
III. PHANTOMS 
Even when legislation enacted by Congress seems to be supported 
by considerable legislative findings, the Court has not been satisfied. It 
appears at times that the Court has transformed questions of fact for 
Congress into questions of law for the Court's determination. In this 
regard, the Court's rigorous approach to the legislative history may be 
windowdressing for a phantom legislative record requirement. 
A Kimel 
The crystal ball assessment of the Kimel decision is in some ways a 
benign portrayal of the Court's analysis, because it accepts at face 
value that the Court would entertain a suitably justified congressional 
response to the problem of age discrimination. A phantom analysis of 
Kimel's holding is less flattering in that it questions the genuineness of 
the Court's assertion. Despite its claims of purported deference to 
189. Similarly, the Court in Lopez and Morrison required Congress to establish far 
more in the way of a nexus to commerce than had been demanded in Commerce Clause ju­
risprudence of the late 1930s and the 1960s. 
190. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) (holding that to construe 
Section 5 as requiring prior judicial invalidation of the state conduct being regulated by 
Congress "would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsi­
bility for implementing the Amendment," and that Congress's power under Section 5 goes 
beyond "merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the 'majestic gen­
eralities' of § 1 of the Amendment"); Cox, supra note 187, at 118-21 (1966) (suggesting that 
equal protection standards may at times be enforced more effectively by Congress than by 
the courts); Post & Siegel, supra note 149, at 498-500 (discussing historical development and 
importance of Court's Section 5 approach in Morgan). 
191. See Post & Siegel, supra note 149, at 520 (recounting how Court's plurality opinion 
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411  U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973), relied on congressional legislation in 
gender discrimination area to inform and support its emerging view that sex-based classifica­
tions require intermediate scrutiny under Section 1); id. at 504 (discussing how Court viewed 
antidiscrimination statutes of 1960s as implementing the equality norms of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and this view allowed Court readily to approve Congress's extension of Title 
VII to the States as appropriate Section 5 legislation in late 1970s). 
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Congress's factfinding, a phantom assessment suggests that no amount 
of factfinding by Congress could pass muster. 
The decision in Kimel can be viewed as fitting the phantom cate­
gory, because the Court has implicitly suggested that Congress does 
not have the authority to enact any legislation under Section 5 to pro­
tect groups that are entitled only to rational basis review under Sec­
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.192 Congress lacks such authority 
once the Court has restricted the "congruence and proportionality" 
test from City of Boerne to mean that Congress's legislative powers 
under Section 5 are no greater than the Court's power to invalidate 
state action under Section l.193 
In City of Boerne, the Court held that there is an important distinc­
tion between remedial legislation and legislation that results in a "sub­
stantive change in the governing law." It created the "congruence and 
proportionality" test to evaluate whether legislation was appropriately 
limited to Congress's remedial authority. The Court recognized that 
the distinction "between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitu­
tional actions and measures that make substantive change in the gov­
erning law is not easy to discern,"194 but it fashioned its new approach 
in an arguably deferential framework when it stated that "Congress 
must have wide latitude in determining where [the distinction] lies."195 
With hindsight, one can see that the City of Boerne test left 
Congress little room to enact legislation to protect nonsuspect groups 
or to enforce nonfundamental rights196 despite the purported defer­
ence to Congress. RFRA failed the congruence and proportionality 
test because the statute banned far more conduct than would be un­
constitutional under the lenient standards applied in the free exercise 
192. Throughout this section, we use terms like "implicitly suggested," because we ac­
knowledge that our argument does not directly follow from the language of the Court's deci­
sion. Our argument here is based on speculation and inference rather than on the plain lan­
guage of the majority opinion. 
193. In City of Boerne, the Court held that Congress may enact remedial, but not "sub­
stantive," legislation under its Section 5 powers. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 
(1997) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the remedial, rather than substan­
tive, nature of the Enforcement Clause."). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 520. 
196. The Court's decisions in Kimel and Garrett assessed congressional enforcement of 
nonsuspect classes under Section l 's Equal Protection Clause. The Court's decisions from 
the 1999 Term invalidating patent and trademark laws that regulated the States each in­
volved Congress enforcing nonfundamental property rights under Section l 's Due Process 
Clause. The Court in those cases did not go so far as to say that Congress has no authority 
whatsoever to protect nonfundamental rights under Section 1. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). Rather, it stated that: "Congress 
came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the States." Id. at 640. 
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area for neutral legislation.197 The Court suggested that legislation 
must be limited to situations in which there was evidence that the 
banned conduct had "been motivated by religious bigotry."198 Broader 
legislation would have to be justified under strict or intermediate scru­
tiny.199 No amount of legislative factfinding would appear to be able to 
cure this defect in the legal standard.200 
The decision in Kimel clarified the narrow nature of Congress's 
power to enact legislation when dealing with nonsuspect groups or 
nonfundamental rights. As in City of Boerne, the Court compared the 
scope of the actions that were made unlawful under the federal legisla­
tion with the Court's prior holdings concerning what kind of conduct 
has been found to be unconstitutional in the subject area. Assessing its 
previous decisions, the Court concluded that the "Constitution permits 
States to draw lines on the basis of age when they have a rational basis 
for doing so at a class-based level, even if it 'is probably not true' that 
those reasons are valid in the majority of cases."201 The Court's earlier 
deference to state legislative judgments was hardly the virtual invita­
tion to arbitrary treatment that Kimel described.202 Measured against 
197. "Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, 
say one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching 
judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation." City of Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 534. 
198. "In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have 
been motivated by religious bigotry." Id. at 535. 
199. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that laws of general 
applicability which created an incidental burden of religious exercise were not unconstitu­
tional absent direct evidence of religious animus). 
200. As the Court stated: 
Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered remedial, pre­
ventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to 
a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive 
change in constitutional protections. 
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
201. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000) (emphasis added); see id. at 83-
84 (discussing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-73 (1991) (holding that mandatory re­
tirement of state judges is not violative of Equal Protection Clause); Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 98-112 (1979) (holding that mandatory retirement of foreign service employees does 
not violate equal protection component of Fifth Amendment); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976) (holding that mandatory retirement of state police does not vio­
late Equal Protection Clause)). 
202. See, e.g. , Vance, 440 U.S. at 101, 103 (relying on critical foreign policy role played 
by foreign service employees, and also hazards and wear and tear of extended overseas duty, 
in upholding mandatory retirement); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314-15 nn.7-8 (relying on arduous 
physical challenges facing uniformed police in upholding mandatory retirement). Lower 
courts have rightly understood that they can invalidate age discrimination by state agencies 
on rational basis grounds after Murgia and Vance. See, e.g. , Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993, 
996-97 (7th Cir. 1997) (invalidating mandatory retirement of public school teachers); Indus. 
Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66-70 (Colo. 1996) (invalidating state's refusal 
to pay workers' compensation benefits for permanent total disability beyond age sixty-five). 
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this Kimel test, however, it is not surprising that a broad ban on age 
discrimination in public employment "prohibits substantially more 
state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held 
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis 
standard. "203 
Although the Kimel Court claimed to leave room for Congress to 
enact remedial legislation for a group that only receives rational basis 
treatment under Section 1,204 it is hard to imagine what kind of evi­
dence could have justified such prophylactic legislation. The Court 
noted that Congress "never identified . . .  any discrimination whatso­
ever that rose to the level of constitutional violation."205 Because the 
States have the power (according to the Court) to draw age-based 
lines "even if it 'is probably not true' that those reasons are valid in 
the majority of cases,"206 the examples of state line-drawing on the ba­
sis of age were not - and seemingly could not have been - evidence 
of unconstitutionally arbitrary state action. Accordingly, Congress 
"has no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was nec­
essary in this field. "207 
Having determined that there was no evidence in support of the 
need for any legislation, the Court did not have to consider the ques­
tion of what would be the permissible language of legislation that pro­
portionally responded to such a problem. Given its statement about 
the constitutional power of states to create and apply age-based dis­
tinctions, the Court probably would have required that the 
Congressional response include evidence of animus as well as arbi­
trariness. That is an unlikely legislative response for several reasons. 
First, because age discrimination is fundamentally about arbitrary 
stereotypes, not invidious hostility to old people,208 Congress is un­
likely to be able to find substantial evidence addressing the presence 
of animus. Second, Congress would be hard-pressed to amass such 
animus-related evidence (even if it existed) against a politically potent 
constituency of public employers when it has never done so against 
private employers in the first place. Finally, an animus standard is not 
the kind of response we expect from Congress when it legislates in the 
civil law area. Congress in its prophylactic role seeks to articulate 
broad standards that can apply to classes of individuals; an animus 
203. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86. 
204. "That the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional, 
while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our § 5 inquiry. Difficult and intrac­
table problems often require powerful remedies, and we have never held that § 5 precludes 
Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic legislation." Id. at 88. 
205. Id. at 89. 
206. See supra note 201. 
207. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. 
208. See supra note 174 (discussing findings of legal and social science scholars). 
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standard is more individualized and not likely to bar more conduct 
than is already barred under background constitutional norms. It 
makes little sense for Congress to invest its legislative capital on 
merely repeating what is already unconstitutional under existing law. 
The Kimel decision may thus be understood as holding that 
Congress has no power to enact remedial legislation under Section 5 
for a group that is only subject to rational basis scrutiny, because it is 
highly unlikely that any such legislation would merely ban conduct 
that was "irrational" for Section 1 purposes. The "proportionality and 
congruence" test has arguably come to mean that Congress's powers 
under Section 5 are coextensive with the Court's authority to declare 
government conduct unconstitutional under Section 1. Moreover, the 
Court strongly implied that there is no such thing as unconstitutionally 
irrational age discrimination at the hands of the States. 
The Garrett decision is more explicit in its suggestion that 
Congress's powers under Section 5 extend no further than the Court's 
authority to declare government conduct unconstitutional. In their 
separate concurrence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor stated: 
If the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by their 
mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would 
have expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States and also the 
courts of the United States extensive litigation and discussion of the con­
stitutional violations. This confirming judicial documentation does not 
exist.209 
But "confirming judicial documentation" would only be required if 
Congress's Section 5 authority is coextensive with the Court's author­
ity under Section 1 .  
In  the suspect class area, a rule limiting Congress's authority to 
remedying actual violations of Section 1 would still leave Congress 
with the authority to enact legislation prohibiting conduct that would 
be unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review. In Kimel, the Court 
suggested that broad restrictions on discrimination can be enacted for 
groups entitled to heightened scrutiny.210 In the nonsuspect class area, 
209. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 968-69 (2001) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
210. "The Act, through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, 
prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be 
held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard." Kimel, 
528 U.S. at 86. By implication, such broad restrictions would be permissible if the applicable 
standard were heightened scrutiny. 
The Court was careful to distinguish its holding about the ADEA from possible applica­
tion to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Hence, the Court said: "Age classifications, 
unlike governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot be characterized as 'so seldom 
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such con­
siderations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.' " Id. at 83. It is also helpful to 
remember that the Kimel decision was written by Justice O'Connor, who has been a strong 
supporter of equality rights for women in her decisions as a member of the Court. See, e.g. , 
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however, such a rule would preclude Congress from enacting prophy­
lactic legislation subjecting the States to private damages actions, be­
cause it is hard to imagine that Congress could enact legislation that 
did no more than bar conduct already unconstitutional under rational 
basis review. In the few instances where the Court has struck down 
legislation under rational basis review, it has written fact-intensive de­
cisions that emphasize the evidence of animus and irrationality in the 
record.21 1 Those types of decisions are not well suited to legislative 
rulemaking; they are best decided on a case by case basis in the judi­
cial arena under a constitutional law standard. 
The above interpretation of Kimel would have substantial ramifi­
cations. Not only would Congress lack the power to authorize private 
damages actions against the States pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
following Seminole Tribe, but it would have comparably diminished 
authority to regulate the States pursuant to Section 5, except when 
protecting groups or enforcing rights entitled to heightened scrutiny 
under Section 1. On this reading of Kimel, Congress would be wasting 
its time if it tried to re-enact recently invalidated legislation by holding 
more hearings and narrowing the scope of statutory coverage. 
Congress might as well leave these problems to the courts under ra­
tional basis review. 
B. Morrison 
The phantom aspect to the decision in Morrison is more apparent 
than in Kimel, because the Court is relatively clear in transforming a 
question of fact (for Congress's determination) into a question of law 
(for the Court's determination) while giving lip service to the notion 
that it might defer to Congress's findings. The Court in Morrison 
strongly suggested that Congress lacks the authority to enact any 
"noneconomic" legislation under the Commerce Clause. Congress 
does not have this authority because the Court has reshaped the "sub­
stantial effect on interstate commerce" test from Lopez to mean that, 
irrespective of the record compiled, Congress's legislative authority 
under the Commerce Clause does not include the power to enact 
noneconomic legislation. 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
21 1 .  For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. , 473 U.S. 432 
(1985), the Court was influenced by direct evidence of animus against individuals with men­
tal retardation. Similarly, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court was influenced 
by evidence of animus against gay men and lesbians that purportedly motivated the state­
wide initiative. Nonetheless, the Garrett Court questioned whether evidence of "mere nega­
tive attitudes or fear" is enough to demonstrate a constitutional violation for a nonsuspect 
class. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964. 
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In retrospect, one can see how the Court in Lopez was beginning 
to draw a distinction between the regulation of economic and non­
economic activity. For example, the Court rationalized its earlier deci­
sion in Wickard v. Filburn212 by noting that although Filburn "is per­
haps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority 
over intrastate activity," it is distinguishable from Lopez because it 
"involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a 
school zone does not."213 The Court also hinted that the determination 
of whether a statute regulates economic activity can be made through 
an examination of the plain language of the statute rather than 
through an assessment of the legislative record.214 In other words, this 
determination could be made by the Court rather than by Congress.215 
In Morrison, the Court signaled even more strongly that activity 
must be economic to be regulated under the Commerce Clause, and 
that whether the activity was economic was for the Court to deter­
mine. It stated that Congress may not legislate in the areas of "non­
economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's ag­
gregate effect on interstate commerce,"216 irrespective of how much 
legislative history it compiles. Similarly, the Court suggested that 
Congress may not regulate under the Commerce Clause in the areas of 
family law, marriage, divorce, and child rearing.217 In other words, the 
Court countenanced the possibility that Congress could gather evi­
dence demonstrating that "noneconomic" activity has a substantial ef­
fect on commerce but then concluded that no amount of legislative 
factfinding on the part of Congress could satisfy the Court's stan­
dards.218 It transformed the Commerce Clause test into a question of 
212. 317 U.S. 1 1 1  (1942). 
213. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
214. The Court stated: 
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or 
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Second 
922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula­
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, there­
fore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are 
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially af­
fects interstate commerce. 
Id. at 561 (emphasis added). 
215. Nonetheless, the Lopez decision was equivocal on this issue, because the Court 
then proceeded to examine whether the statute contained a jurisdictional element of an in­
terstate commerce requirement and whether the legislative record demonstrated an effect 
on interstate commerce. Id. at 561-63. 
216. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). The Court referenced the im­
proper Congressional regulation of criminal conduct in Morrison even though the provision 
at issue was a civil remedy provision. 
217. Id. at 615-16. 
218. These possible exclusions might all be advanced as plausible under a reinvigorated 
Tenth Amendment. (The Eleventh Amendment is not relevant to the decision in Morrison, 
because Brzonkala was suing only private parties in the part of the lawsuit reviewed by the 
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law rather than a question of fact with the following statement: 
"Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently 
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them 
is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be 
settled finally only by this Court."219 The Court could simply look at 
the subject matter which was being regulated and decide for itself 
whether the subject matter was economic in character, harking back to 
the days when the Court used to conclude that only certain industries 
could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. 
C. Implications 
The implications of the emerging phantom methodology are sub­
stantial. In separation of powers terms, Congress's powers under Sec­
tion 5 and the Commerce Clause have been seriously eroded. Indeed, 
the Court has withdrawn more power from Congress than it was able 
to achieve under the short-lived National League of Cities standard. 
1. Section 5 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a constitutional provi­
sion that explicitly grants power to Congress to regulate the States. 
Whereas Section 1 acts negatively upon the States and inherently 
grants authority to the judiciary to monitor compliance with those 
limitations, Section 5 grants authority to Congress. Because the Four­
teenth Amendment was ratified in an era of distrust of both the States 
and the judiciary, the historical evidence suggests that the framers of 
Section 5 did not intend to limit the scope of Congress's powers to 
situations that the judiciary had already declared a violation of Section 
1.220 Even if one does not accept this historical evidence, the text of the 
Supreme Court.) The Court, however, reached its conclusions in Morrison by revamping the 
meaning of the term "commerce" and how Congress can establish that activity has a substan­
tial effect on commerce. 
219. Id. at 614, quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2. (1995) (quoting Justice Black's con­
currence in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 , 273 (1964)). Al­
though the statement from Lopez was a quotation from Justice Black's concurrence in Heart 
of Atlanta Motel, the Court's reliance is wholly inapt. Justice Black made his statement in 
the context of trying to determine whether Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which he 
had already concluded was facially constitutional, could be constitutionally applied against 
the defendants in the particular case under review. The Heart of Atlanta Motel had argued 
that Title II could not constitutionally reach its activities, because those activities were intra­
state in nature. The "as applied" aspect to the lawsuit, Justice Black explained, was a judicial 
rather than a legislative question. Justice Black, however, clearly recognized Congress's im­
portant policy role in deciding what activities to regulate under the Commerce Clause. As he 
stated in the phrase preceding the quotation: "The choice of policy is of course within the 
exclusive power of Congress." Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concur­
ring). The current Court, by contrast, seems prepared to take those policy choices away from 
Congress by shrinking the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
220. For further discussion of this argument, see Colker, supra note 96, at 663. 
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Fourteenth Amendment clearly calls for a different role for the States 
and Congress. The effect of the Court's recent Section 5 jurispru­
dence, however, may be to eradicate Congress's distinctive Section 5 
role by limiting it to banning conduct that the courts would otherwise 
declare unconstitutional. No amount of factfinding by Congress seems 
sufficient to give it authority to determine what prophylactic measures 
are needed to guarantee the equal protection of the laws. 
With its decision in Kimel, the Court effectively invited challenges 
to core civil rights legislation, and states are lining up to claim addi­
tional Eleventh Amendment immunities. The Garrett decision now 
precludes private employment discrimination actions for monetary 
damages against states under ADA Title I. One can expect future 
challenges to private actions for monetary damages against the States 
under ADA Title II.221 In addition, the constitutionality of abrogation 
under the Equal Pay Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act 
("FMLA") is being litigated in the lower courts.222 Congress's Section 
5 authority under the Equal Pay Act was recently upheld by the Elev­
enth Circuit as a congruent and proportional response to the problem 
of wage discrimination.223 Although the Court acknowledged that 
Congress had made no findings with respect to wage discrimination in 
the public sector, it opined that "such [absence of] findings [is] not fa­
tal because gender discrimination is a problem of national import."224 
Congress, of course, thought that age discrimination and disability dis­
crimination were also problems of national import, but the courts of 
appeals may be forgiven for absorbing from Kimel and Garrett the 
teaching that the judiciary alone should decide which forms of status 
discrimination engaged in by state employers are important enough to 
warrant Section 5 protection. 
While the Equal Pay Act has fared well in the lower courts,225 the 
FMLA has not. Six circuits and a number of district courts have con-
221. Prior to Kimel and Garrett, two circuits had held that Congress exceeded its Section 
5 enforcement powers when it enacted ADA Title II, which prohibits discrimination in the 
services, programs or activities of a public entity. See Alsbrook v. City of Moumelle, 184 F.3d 
999, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1999) (en bane); Brown v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 
703-07 (4th Cir. 1999). The Garrett Court expressly declined to reach this issue. See Bd. of 
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 960 n.1 (2001). 
222. For further discussion, see Brian Ray, Note, "Out the Window?": Prospects for the 
EPA and FM LA After Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1755 (2001). 
223. Hundertmark v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (1 1 th Cir. 2000). 
224. See id. at 1276. The Seventh Circuit also issued a post-Kimel decision upholding 
Congress's Section 5 authority under the Equal Pay Act. Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 
927 (7th Cir. 2000), cert denied 121 S. Ct. 2241 (2001). That court likewise downplayed the 
absence of legislative findings involving wage discrimination by state employers, because 
"the historical record clearly demonstrates that gender discrimination is a problem that is 
national in scope." Id. at 935. 
225. Apart from Hundertmark and Varner, see Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 
806 (6th Cir. 2000). Lower court cases upholding the Equal Pay Act that were decided after 
Boerne but before Kimel include O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 1999); 
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eluded that application of the FMLA to the States exceeded 
Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5; many of these cases 
have been decided since Kimel.226 These recent cases found a lack of 
congruence and proportionality based in part on Congress's failure to 
identify "widespread and pervasive evidence of gender-based leave 
discrimination in the workplace."227 One should expect the Supreme 
Court in the next several years to rule on the constitutionality of abro­
gating states' immunity under each of these civil rights statutes and 
perhaps under the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII as 
well. 
2. Commerce Clause 
The long-term Commerce Clause implications of the Morrison de­
cision are not entirely clear. Defendants are currently challenging the 
constitutionality of criminal laws that purportedly regulate non­
economic behavior. The Sixth Circuit recently concluded that the 
Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime to engage in robbery or ex­
tortion affecting interstate commerce, could not reach the actions of 
an individual who stole the receipts of a restaurant's business from the 
home of the restaurant owner.228 Citing the language from Morrison 
regarding the need for a distinction between what is "truly national 
and what is truly local," the court found that "upholding federal juris­
diction over [the defendant's] offense would, in essence, acknowledge 
a general federal police power with respect to the crimes of robbery 
and extortion."229 By interpreting the statute to require a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce, even without a rigorous jurisdictional 
provision, the Sixth Circuit avoided invalidating the statute as uncon-
Anderson v. State University of New York, 169 F.3d 1 17, 1 18 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated, 120 S. 
Ct. 929 (2000); and Ussery v. State of Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1998). It is worth 
noting that the circuits heavily favored the validity of ADEA abrogation during this pre­
Kimel period as well. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the ADA's abrogation of 
sovereign immunity was constitutional, a position rejected in Garrett. See Garrett v. Bd. of 
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1999). 
226. See Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 
(2d Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000); Kazmier v. 
Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 
223 (3d Cir. 2000); Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2000); Philbrick v. Univ. of 
Conn., 90 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Ct. 2000). For pre-Kimel decisions invalidating FMLA abroga­
tion, see, for example, Kilvitis v. County of Lozerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408, 419 (M.D. Pa. 
1999); McGregor v. Goord, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Thomson v. Ohio State 
Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (S.D. Ohio 1998). 
227. Philbrick, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 201; see Hale, 219 F.3d at 68-69; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 
528-29; Chittister, 226 F.3d at 228-29. 
228. United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000). 
229. Id. at 240. 
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stitutional.230 Lower courts are examining other fedt:(ral statutes to de­
termine if they require a sufficient effect on interstate commerce as a 
jurisdictional element.231 
Congress is searching for ways to get around the Morrison deci­
sion. It seems to have given up on the possibility of holding sufficient 
hearings for legislation to pass muster under the new Commerce 
Clause standard. Instead, it is seeking to amend federal criminal laws 
to contain an explicit jurisdictional element. It has already amended 
the Gun-Free School Zones law to include a jurisdictional element.232 
A bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives which 
would provide a jurisdictional element to the Violence Against 
Women Act.233 
Although this turn of events may enable Congress to continue to 
exercise its authority under the Commerce Clause, there is an unfor­
tunate price for our system of government. A distinctive strength of 
the legislative branch is the ability to think on a broad policy level 
about problems of national concern and to hold wide-ranging hearings 
to learn more about these problems. The increased tendency over the 
last two hundred years for Congress to hold hearings is an encouraging 
development, made possible largely by improvements in transporta­
tion and technology. In reviewing constitutionality under the Com-
230. The Hobbs Act criminalizes certain conduct that "obstructs, delays, or affects 
commerce" and does not use the adverb "substantially" to modify "affects." See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a). Although the Sixth Circuit had consistently permitted the effect on commerce to 
be de minimis when the criminal acts were directed at businesses, see, e.g. , United States v. 
Valenzeno, 123 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1997), it declined to apply such a low jurisdictional 
prerequisite to criminal acts directed at private citizens, Wang, 222 F.3d at 239. 
231 .  The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 ("CSRA"), has come 
under attack as exceeding Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. Until it was 
amended in 1998, the Act made it a criminal offense, punishable by up to two years' impris­
onment, "willfully [to] fail[] to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who 
resides in another State." 18 U.S.C. § 228 (a) (1994). In a decision recently reversed en bane, 
the Sixth Circuit panel found the CSRA unconstitutionally overinclusive because "it predi­
cates criminal jurisdiction not on flight across state lines, but on simple diversity of resi­
dence." United States v. Faase, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd en bane 2001 WL 1058237 
(6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2001). In 1998, CSRA was amended by the Deadbeat Parents Punishment 
Act to require as a prerequisite to jurisdiction that an individual have traveled in interstate 
commerce with the intent to evade a support obligation. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (a)(2) (2000). In a 
case involving prosecutions under both the 1992 and 1998 versions of CSRA, a trial court in 
the Second Circuit concluded that the Act violated Congress's authority under the Com­
merce Clause. United States v. King, 2001 WL 1 11278, No. Sl 00 CR. 653 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 8, 2001). This decision relied heavily on the reasoning in the Faase panel decision and 
was inconsistent with the Second Circuit's own precedent. See United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 
101 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding CSRA as within Congress's authority). 
232. See Pub. L. 104-208, § lOl(f) (1996) (amending § 657 to substitute "discharge a fire­
arm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place" 
for "discharge a firearm at a place"). 
233. See H.R. 429, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (Violence Against Women Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 2001) (introduced by Rep. Conyers on February 6, 2001, and co­
sponsored by eighty-nine members of Congress). 
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merce Clause, however, the Court is sending Congress the message 
simply to focus on whether the text explicitly demonstrates that an ac­
tivity is economic in nature and involves interstate commerce. Simi­
larly, in the Section 5 area, Congress should not even bother to con­
sider remedial legislation for groups not historically accorded 
heightened scrutiny. 
3. Circumventing Garcia 
When the Supreme Court decided Garcia in 1985, then-Associate 
Justice Rehnquist's forecast was clear: " I do not think it incumbent on 
those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle 
that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a ma­
jority of this Court."234 Justice O'Connor's dissent stated somewhat 
less boldly: "I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in 
time again assume its constitutional responsibility."235 
At the time those predictions were penned, most observers 
thought that the Court intended again to revisit its Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence and return to a standard similar to that set forth in 
National League of Cities. Instead, it has relied on the Eleventh 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause, directly withdrawing power 
from Congress without necessarily handing it to the States. The simi­
larity in rhetoric between National League of Cities and Morrison is 
striking. But the Court's new strategy has permitted further intrusions 
into Congress's powers than would a return to the National League of 
Cities standard under the Tenth Amendment. 
In National League of Cities, the Court stated that Congress "may 
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or 
their ability to function effectively in a federal system."236 In order to 
determine whether such inappropriate action was taking place, the 
Court focused on whether the federal law was interfering with a fun­
damental attribute of state sovereignty.237 The Court was faced with 
the question whether the extension of the minimum wage and maxi­
mum hour protections to state employees who worked in jobs such as 
fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health and parks 
and recreation violated the Tenth Amendment. Ruling for the States, 
234. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
235. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
236. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976). 
237. See id. at 845-46 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) 
("The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations are 'functions 
essential to separate and independent existence,' . . .  so that Congress may not abrogate the 
States' otherwise plenary authority to make them.")). In prior decisions, the Court had ob­
served that Congress could not, for example, determine where a state should "locate its own 
seat of government." Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)). 
October 2001] Dissing Congress 135 
the Court found that direct regulation of the hours and compensation 
of these state employees involved a "forced relinquishment of impor­
tant governmental activities,"238 thereby interfering with "traditional 
aspects of state sovereignty."239 The National League of Cities decision 
seemingly required future courts to distinguish between situations in 
which Congress was and was not regulating traditional aspects of state 
sovereignty. As we discussed in Part I, however, National League of 
Cities had a minimal effect on the law. Although the decision created a 
traditional/nontraditional state function distinction, few activities ap­
peared to fit on the "traditional" side of the ledger.240 
The Lopez decision in effect signaled a reconfiguration of the dis­
tinction between traditional and nontraditional state functions. The 
Justice Department had argued that it could regulate firearms in a lo­
cal school zone, because preventing crime can have an impact on the 
nation's economic well-being. The Court responded: 
[U]nder the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, Congress 
could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic pro­
ductivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, 
and child custody), for example. Under the theories that the Government 
presents in support of section 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limita­
tion on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or 
education where States historically have been sovereign.241 
Scholars were relatively muted as to the importance of Lopez 
when it was decided.242 The Morrison decision, however, revealed that 
Lopez effectively created what National League of Cities could not -
a traditional state function test that the Court was willing to apply in 
future cases. Seizing on the language from Lopez in which the Court 
suggested that Congress may not regulate traditional state functions 
under the Commerce Clause, the Court stated: "We accordingly reject 
the argument that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent 
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on in­
terstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local."243 
This decision could not directly overrule Garcia, because the 
FLSA - the statute at issue in Garcia - was clearly of an economic 
238. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847. 
239. Id. at 849. 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
241. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). 
242. See, e.g. , SHAPIRO, supra note 79, at 141 (anticipating - in a postscript to his 1994 
lectures on federalism - that "the impact of the [Lopez] decision on broader questions of 
federal power will be limited"); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 
676 (1995) (describing the Lopez decision as imposing only a "minor restraint on congres­
sional power"). 
243. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000). 
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character. But there was less need to overrule Garcia directly, because 
the Court in the previous Term had already invalidated the applica­
tion of the FLSA to damage suits by private parties against the 
States.244 The Morrison decision, however, did allow the Court to 
withdraw Congress's power in areas that are both "noneconomic" and 
"traditional state functions." Future courts will have to wrestle with 
both of these standards. 
While the traditional/nontraditional distinction proved elusive to 
the Court in an earlier era, this Court may be more willing to police a 
similar distinction through an economic/noneconomic test. We have 
yet to see whether even more calibrated legislative factfinding or new 
jurisdictional elements will allow Congress to continue to find ways to 
legislate in these areas. What the Morrison decision and its progeny 
may reveal is that a standard akin to the traditional/nontraditional 
state function test can be a workable distinction for a Court deter­
mined to withdraw authority from Congress. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 
A. Legislative History in Two Settings 
We have identified two somewhat contradictory trends that can be 
seen in the Rehnquist Court's most recent decisions. On the one hand, 
the Court is suggesting that it is quite interested in examining the leg­
islative record in the Commerce Clause and Section 5 contexts, al­
though it wants Congress to amass more detailed documentary sup­
port under an evolving constitutional law standard. On the other hand, 
the Court is suggesting that it should make critical jurisdictional de­
terminations and that no amount of factfinding by Congress will affect 
its analysis of these legal questions. Both of these themes can be seen 
in the same cases, suggesting that the Court is still sorting out for itself 
which mode of analysis is the most appropriate. 
These seemingly conflicting approaches can perhaps be better un­
derstood if one also examines the same Court's approach to legislative 
history in a pure statutory review setting. Key members of the new ac­
tivist majority have expressed a persistent lack of faith in the reliability 
of legislative history when construing the meaning of federal stat­
utes.245 This hostility stems from a belief that such history is at best un-
244. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
245. See, e.g. , Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia J., concurring) ("It is 
neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and ef­
fective application of the statutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectua­
tion of congressional intent, to give legislative force to each snippet of analysis, and even 
every case citation, in committee reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what 
the voting Members of Congress actually had in mind."); Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & 
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representative of the Congress as a whole and at worst susceptible to 
strategic or insincere manipulation by its drafters.246 Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, the leading textualists on the Court, have been especially 
emphatic in contending that courts should not view committee reports, 
hearing testimony, or floor debate as informative for members in gen­
eral, much less as reflective of an institutional understanding as to the 
basis for particular legislation.247 
Spurred by these textualist reservations, the Court in the 1990s has 
become more focused on parsing the literal terms of each statute while 
minimizing the role of legislative intent.248 By the mid 1990s, the Court 
was invoking legislative history in statutory cases far less often than it 
had a decade earlier.249 This decline in use persisted through the late 
1990s, particularly in opinions authored by the very Justices who have 
identified the importance of the legislative record when reviewing the 
constitutionality of Congress's work.250 
Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279-81 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to "the fairyland in 
which legislative history reflects what was in Congress's mind" and dismissing it as "fiction of 
Jack-in-the-Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a handful of . . .  members . . .  
were . . .  aware of the drafting evolution that the Court describes"); Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust 
& Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 462 n.2 (1999) (Thomas, J. and Scalia, 
J., concurring) (observing that "the history of rejected legislative proposals . . .  is irrelevant 
for the simple reason that Congress enacted the Code, not the legislative history predating 
it"). In each of these quotations, the focus is on the reliability of legislative history as re­
flecting institutional preferences or understandings, not the constitutional legitimacy of a 
court's invoking it. See also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) 
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting Court's 
use of legislative history as a tool for interpreting Mine Safety and Health Act); Negonsott v. 
Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 100 n.** (1993) (Justices Scalia and Thomas rejecting the Court's use 
of legislative history as a tool for interpreting the Kansas Act); Pub. Citizen v. United States 
Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-73 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (re­
jecting Court's use of legislative history as a tool for interpreting Federal Advisory Commit­
tee Act). 
246. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF I NTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1997). See generally Brudney, supra note 184, at 47-56; William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640-49, 651-53 (1990); Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Congress Is a "They" Not an "/": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 I NT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 
239 (1992). 
247. See supra notes 245-246. 
248. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doc­
trine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351 (1994); Richard J. Pierce, New Hypertextualism: An Invitation 
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995). 
249. See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Su­
preme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212-220; Patricia M. Wald, Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of 
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme 
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990). 
250. Professor Tiefer deftly discusses seventeen opinions since 1995 in which legislative 
history has been invoked by the majority over objections from Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
See Tiefer, supra note 249. Although we agree with Professor Tiefer that legislative history 
was important in those opinions, we are not persuaded that they signify a trend toward in­
creased use of legislative history. Almost all of the seventeen cases discussed by Professor 
Tiefer were authored by Justices Stevens, Souter, or Breyer - Justices who have expressed 
comparable respect for Congress's record in the context of constitutional review. While not 
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The disfavored status of legislative history in statutory interpreta­
tion is well illustrated in two relatively routine cases decided during 
the 1999-2000 Term interpreting, respectively, the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act Amendments of 1985251 and the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 ("RIC0").252 Each statute was ac­
companied by a rich legislative record, cited by the Court in prior 
opinions253 and invoked by the litigants in their briefs to the Court.254 
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas's majority opinion in each case was no­
tably silent with respect to the legislative history, instead relying exclu­
sively on formal language arguments or analysis of the surrounding 
common law.255 
as rhetorically intense on this matter as Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy regularly join (and sometimes write) statutory majority opinions rejecting legisla­
tive history. See, e.g. , Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 ,  482 (1999) (O'Connor, 
J., majority opinion) (holding that ADA legislative history should not be considered because 
text is clear on its face, despite dissent's extensive reliance on that history); United States v. 
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (declining to resort to legis­
lative history because of "straightforward statutory command," although court of appeals 
and dissent invoked different aspects of that history); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 
S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (2001 ) (holding that Federal Arbitration Act legislative history should not 
be considered because Court's conclusions were "directed by the text," although dissent in­
voked detailed discussion of that history; majority opinion by Justice Kennedy); Boggs v. 
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 869 (1997) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (deciding ERISA contro­
versy without reference to legislative history, although dissent relies in part on excerpts from 
that history). 
Of course, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also rely on legislative history in some of 
their statutory majority opinions, and the fact that Justices Scalia and Thomas on occasion 
join those opinions serves as a reminder that principled methodological stances have their 
limits. See, e.g. , Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000) (O'Connor opinion holding FDA lacks authority to regulate tobacco products as cus­
tomarily marketed, and relying heavily on legislative history; Scalia and Thomas join major­
ity). 
In any event, we have shown that two arguably conflicting strains can be found in the 
Court's recent constitutional opinions: one creates a greater role for legislative history in the 
constitutional law context while the other suggests that Congress may have no proper role 
whatsoever in determining the scope of its authority. It is too early to predict which of these 
two trends will dominate the Court's methodology in the future (if one comes to predomi­
nate at all). 
251. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (determining whether em­
ployer's compensatory time policy violated the FLSA). 
252. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000) (determining the meaning of the phrase 
"injured . . .  by reason of' a "conspiracy"). 
253. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242, 245-48 (1989) (rely­
ing on legislative history to support a broad construction of RICO provisions); Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-93 (1985) (same); Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23-29 (1 983) (same); United States v. Turkette, 452 U .S. 576, 586-87, 591-93 (1981 ) 
(same); Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 26-27 (1989) (closely reviewing legislative his­
tory of 1985 FLSA amendments). 
254. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Christensen, 1 999 WL 1204475, at **9-10, *29; Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Christensen, 1999 WL 1128266, at **12-13, *17; 
Brief for Petitioner, Beck, 1999 WL 543861, at *32, *34, *37. 
255. In Christensen, the Court relied on formal language arguments and refused to defer 
to an Opinion Letter by the Department of Labor that supported the petitioner's position. 
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How does one reconcile this disdain for legislative history in the 
statutory setting with the emphasis on legislative history's importance 
by many of the same Justices when assessing congressional enactments 
under the Commerce Clause and Section 5? The new textualists, espe­
cially Justice Scalia, have explained that they are wary of legislative 
history in the statutory context because "it is much more likely to pro­
duce a false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine one."256 In 
the instant constitutional law setting, these Justices have found it more 
difficult to disavow record evidence regarding legislative intent. Ironi­
cally, however, their reliance on the legislative record in search of jus­
tifications for congressional action is susceptible to some of the same 
abuses as they perceive in the pure statutory setting.257 With the 
Court's new requirements, as amplified in the recent Garrett decision, 
that Congress act as a quasi-judicial entity and marshall evidence of 
arguable constitutional law violations by the States in the Section 5 
context, the Court is effectively requiring Congress to adopt a more 
strategic posture. Rather than perform as neutral gatherers of the 
facts, Congressional committees must become advocates, culling the 
almost limitless record of state conduct to focus on incidents and prac­
tices that have the greatest potential for establishing unconstitutional 
intent. 
529 U.S. at 582-88. No reference whatsoever was made to the legislative history. In Beck, 
Justice Thomas interpreted the phrase "injured by reason of a conspiracy" by looking exclu­
sively to the common-law of civil conspiracy. 529 U.S. at 500-01 (quoting Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)) (justifying that theory of interpretation by stating 
that when Congress uses language with a settled meaning at common law the Court pre­
sumes that Congress "knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor­
rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken . . .  unless otherwise in­
structed"). It is a mark of how textualist norms now set the standard that the dissent in each 
case addressed only the majority's own reasoning; there were no references at all to legisla­
tive history. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 592-96 (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissent­
ing) (disputing majority's refusal to defer to Department of Labor but never discussing leg­
islative history); Beck, 529 U.S. at 508-12 (Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting) (disputing 
majority's interpretation of the common law and referring instead to the "plain language" of 
the statute). For discussion of how the legislative history accompanying these two statutes 
might have influenced judicial analyses and outcomes, see Brudney, supra note 135, at 184-
85, 199. 
256. SCALIA, supra note 246, at 32. The textualists also want to send Congress a message 
that it should draft statutory language with greater care and precision and not use legislative 
history as a means to avoid or finesse politically contentious matters. Increased attention to 
the clarity of text will, in their view, offer clearer guidance to the executive and judicial 
branches than reliance on legislative history. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS 
AND CONGRESS 60 (1997); Brudney, supra note 184, at 16. 
257. The Court's severest critics of legislative history accompanying statutes, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, have relied extensively on The Federalist and on debating history that 
accompanies constitutional text. For a thoughtful discussion of the problems with this posi­
tion, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not 
Statutory Legislative History? 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998). The legislative history at 
issue here is neither purely statutory nor purely constitutional: rather, it involves the consti­
tutionality of a statutory product. 
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Even for those who reject Justice Scalia's conception of legislative 
history as systemically strategic or unreliable,258 this new role for 
Congress is troubling. Factfinding in the legislative arena differs in its 
procedures and objectives from factfinding in the courts. Congress 
collects evidence and builds a record in an effort to consider broad 
policy issues and formulate appropriately general responses, not to 
adjudicate discrete matters of individual justice. Transforming this in­
formation-gathering process into a kind of judicial branch activity in­
vites strategic behavior that diminishes Congress as a lawmaking body. 
Still, to understand why the Rehnquist Court has encouraged such 
heavy reliance on legislative record building as part of its new juris­
prudence under the Commerce Clause and Section 5, it is helpful to 
recognize the limited nature of the options available to the Court. 
When faced with the question of determining the proper scope of 
Congressional authority, the Justices essentially have three choices 
available. First, they can defer to Congress to delineate the proper 
scope of its own authority, so long as its determination is a reasonable 
one. Second, they can construct a more rigorous test under which the 
Court would allow Congress to define the scope of its authority but 
review that determination with care. Because Congress need not ar­
ticulate the authority for its action in the legislation itself, the only 
place to look for Congress's understanding of its authority would be in 
the legislative history of the statute. Third, they can determine the 
proper scope of Congress's authority for themselves and give Congress 
no role in making that determination. 
From the New Deal era until 1995, the Court basically adopted the 
first perspective. It presumed the constitutionality of Congress's ac­
tions but sometimes perused the legislative history for evidence of rea­
sonableness. Since 1995, one might describe the new activists as being 
torn between the second and third perspectives. They have found 
themselves reluctantly surveying the legislative history to determine 
whether Congress had rigorously pronounced and justified its author­
ity to enact legislation.259 But they also have made statements in favor 
258. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 861-69 (1992) (responding to various criticisms of the use of legisla­
tive history); Brudney, supra note 184, at 40-66 (responding to constitutional and practical 
arguments for devaluing legislative history); Eskridge, supra note 257, at 1310-19 (critiquing 
textualist attacks on legislative history as exaggerated or misplaced). 
259. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion for the Court in Lopez in which he 
acknowledged that the Court should examine legislative history as a factor in its determina­
tion of constitutionality. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) ("Although as 
part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of 
course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, re­
garding effect on interstate commerce . . . .  "). Similarly, Justice Kennedy authored the opin­
ion for the Court in City of Boerne in which he examined the legislative record to determine 
if RFRA constituted proper remedial, preventive legislation. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 529-33 (1997); see also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federal­
ism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 799 (1996) (suggesting that federalism should be enforced by "po-
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of the third perspective, under which they can find legislative history 
as irrelevant in the constitutional setting as they do in the statutory 
context. From either perspective, the new activists' distinctly unsym­
pathetic approach toward legislative history in the Section 5 and 
Commerce Clause settings comports with the views expressed by 
many of the same Justices when resolving disputes over statutory 
meaning.260 
When one tries to reconcile the Court's attitudes regarding statu­
tory and constitutional interpretation, one can see that the new activ­
ists may be vacillating between the crystal ball and the phantom ap­
proaches in the constitutional setting. The crystal ball approach is 
appealing because it is consistent with the traditional sense that some 
deference toward Congress is appropriate. But the phantom approach 
allows these justices explicitly to ignore legislative history in both the 
constitutional and statutory settings, creating a form of judicial consis­
tency. As discussed above, however, this move greatly increases the 
power of the judiciary at the expense of a coequal branch of govern­
ment. 
B. Implications for Federalism 
In addition to posing challenges with respect to judicial consis­
tency, the Rehnquist Court's emphasis on a certain type of legislative 
record also raises troubling issues from a federalism perspective. The 
problem is starkly presented in the recent Garrett decision. In that 
case, Congress had created a task force to gather evidence from all 
fifty States relative to the need for national legislation to protect indi­
viduals with disabilities. The Court found, however, that factfinding by 
!icing Congress's deliberative processes and its reasons for regulating"); supra note 167 (sur­
veying academics who contend that it is appropriate for Court to review congressional legis­
lative history as part of its inquiry under the Commerce Clause or Section 5). 
260. Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas's broad-based hostility to legislative history is 
well documented. See, e.g., supra notes 245-246. Justice O'Connor often minimizes the value 
of legislative history when interpreting the language of certain antidiscrimination statutes. 
She refused to examine legislative history to determine whether the ADEA intended to 
cover state court judges. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) ("We will not 
read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are in­
cluded. This does not mean that the Act must mention judges explicitly, although it does 
not . . . .  Rather, it must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it covers judges."). More 
recently, she did not consider the legislative history of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
relevant to determining whether Congress intended the term "disability" to include condi­
tions whose symptoms may be ameliorated through the use of mitigating measures. See 
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). Similarly, Justice Kennedy refused to 
give weight to a key conference report when interpreting the term "subterfuge" under the 
ADEA. See Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). Justice O'Connor 
authored, and Justice Kennedy joined, the majority opinion in Kimel, in which the Court 
skeptically assessed the ADEA's legislative history. See also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 
188 (arguing that the Court's treatment of legislative record in recent Section 5 and Com­
merce Clause cases reflects unacknowledged motives of congressional distrust). 
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this task force documenting instances of discrimination was not suffi­
cient for Section 5 purposes, because Congress had not itself engaged 
in the factfinding and the factfinding did not rise to the level of uncov­
ering what were clearly constitutional violations. 
If future Congresses were to conform their conduct to Garrett, they 
could try to conduct factfinding that would meet the Court's newly 
crafted standard. Congress would presumably have to gather all the 
information itself through its own committee hearings, without reli­
ance on state or local-level organizations or people who live in the 
respective States to gather information themselves. Congress also 
would have to insist that the testimony was so stark that the published 
hearings could be tantamount to evidence usable in future constitu­
tional litigation against the States.261 Such a combative relationship be­
tween Congress and the States, however, is scarcely consistent with 
the dignity deemed appropriate for state sovereignty262 and would cer­
tainly be destructive to our sense of national unity. Indeed, one of the 
ironies of the Court's new jurisprudence is that in a post-Garcia world, 
Congress is more reluctant than ever to treat states in confrontational 
or adversarial terms. Yet without such an aggressive approach, 
Congress is disabled from exercising its "appropriate" Fourteenth 
Amendment power to hold states monetarily responsible for their un­
lawful discriminatory conduct. 
Faced with this seemingly unpalatable option, Congress could de­
cide to use its remaining intact power - the Spending Clause - to 
force states to consent to suits for money damages.263 This approach, 
however, is also not without difficulties. To begin with, it may be im­
practical because the spending power has insufficient substantive limi­
tations to serve as a precise regulatory mechanism. Moreover, reliance 
on the spending power may be such a blunderbuss approach that it 
will effectively "commandeer" aspects of state government.264 It seems 
261. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967 (2001) (re­
quiring Congress to document that there is a "pattern of discrimination by the States which 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also id. at 969 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., con­
curring) (requiring there to be "documentation of patterns of constitutional violations com­
mitted by the State in its official capacity"). 
262. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 709 (1999) ("Federalism requires that Congress 
accord States the respect and dignity due them as residuary sovereigns and joint participants 
in the Nation's governance."). 
263. See supra note 1 1  (discussing Spending Clause). The Senate Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions Committee recently approved a bill that would require states to abide 
by the ADEA as a condition of receiving federal funds. See Daily Lab. Rep., Sept. 14, 2001, 
at A-1 (discussing S.928). 
264. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992), the Supreme Court stated 
that Congress may not simply "commandeer [ J the legislative processes of the States by di­
rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federa.1 regulatory program." See supra note 
79 (discussing New York v. United States). Professor Baker has argued that statutes should 
be presumed to be unconstitutional under the Spending Clause if the statute cannot be char-
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far less preferable as a matter of comity for Congress to determine 
that entire programs will cease to receive financial assistance if dis­
crete civil rights problems are not corrected than merely requiring the 
States to compensate identified victims of discrimination for the injury 
they suffered.265 
Finally, Congress could greatly increase . its funding of federal 
agencies charged with enforcing the various laws that impose substan­
tive standards for the States to follow, in light of the fact that individu­
als will no longer be able to bring suits for money damages. This move, 
however, would require a major shift from the broad federal legisla­
tive trend since the 1960s favoring private enforcement of civil rights 
and related laws.266 In order to reduce the financial and substantive 
concerns associated with reliance on prosecution by federal agencies, 
Congress has crafted fee-shifting and compensatory damages provi­
sions that encourage private attorneys to bring cases on behalf of ag­
grieved individuals. A dramatic enlargement of the federal govern­
ment's enforcement role would create enormous fiscal burdens while 
raising serious questions about the effectiveness of such an ap­
proach.267 Such a change also would threaten federalism values by 
providing for a more aggressive and adversarial national government 
presence in the fifty States. 
acterized as "reimbursement spending" and Congress is seeking to use the Spending Clause 
to engage in direct regulation that would otherwise be impermissible under New York v. 
United States. See Baker, supra note 11 ,  at 1963-64. 
265. Compare section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (conditioning receipt of fed­
eral financial assistance on the provision of nondiscrimination on the basis of disability), with 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (creating private damages remedy for 
victims of employment discrimination at state entities). Congress enacted section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, requiring nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in programs or ac­
tivities receiving federal financial assistance. Pub. L. 93-1 12, Title V, § 504, Sept. 26, 1973, 87 
Stat. 394, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). This law was enacted pursuant to Congress's 
spending powers. Although the Rehabilitation Act was controversial, and twice vetoed by 
President Nixon when it was first passed by Congress, no one questioned the constitutional­
ity of Congress's authority to impose requirements on the States (and other entities) through 
the spending power. See, e.g. , The President's Memorandum of Disapproval, Oct. 27, 1972, 
reported in 8 Weekly Comp. Pres. Docs. 1577, 1579 (1972) (vetoing Rehabilitation Act be­
cause it was fiscally irresponsible and would jeopardize executive branch enforcement 
goals). 
266. See, e.g. , Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a 
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011,  1021-22 (2000) (noting that presently under the 
FLSA, private lawsuits outnumber civil actions brought by the United States by a 10:1 ratio). 
267. See id. at 1022-23 (arguing that federal bureaucracies may respond far less rapidly 
and flexibly than private attorneys to shifting demands for enforcement action, and that 
"Congress may reasonably doubt that federal government resources are wisely used to pur­
sue litigation against state agencies when a private rightholder's interest is great but the 
public interest may be small"). 
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CONCLUSION 
Half a century ago, Justice Jackson dryly observed with respect to 
himself and his colleagues: "We are not final because we are infallible, 
but we are infallible only because we are final."268 The Rehnquist 
Court has in our view become excessively critical of Congress and the 
fallibility of its lawmaking processes in recent Commerce Clause and 
Section 5 decisions. Although the Court has often framed its invalida­
tion of federal laws in states' rights terms, we believe these invalida­
tions must also be understood as a threat to separation of powers. 
The repeated abrogation of federal statutes - including statutes 
expressly supported by the States themselves269 - has resulted in a 
considerable transfer of power to the judiciary. Respect must be 
earned, and it is easy to ridicule Congress by saying that it has not 
earned this Court's good opinion. But ours is a system of government 
in which Congress is expected to engage in broad-based thinking on 
matters of concern to the nation. States are well able to protect their 
own interests as participants in this national political process,270 and it 
is neither necessary nor prudent for the Court to insist repeatedly on a 
redistribution of authority at Congress's expense. In doing so, the cur­
rent Court has conveyed the message that Congress is suspect in the 
powers it exercises and the manner in which it exercises them. That is 
not a message we should countenance the Court sending to this or any 
future Congress. 
268. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
269. See supra notes 161, 176 (discussing widespread support for VAWA and ADA 
from state officials and state-level organizations). 
270. See supra Part 11.C.3 and notes 161, 176 (noting that States were amply represented 
and actively participated in various congressional enactments extending coverage). See gen­
erally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Larry Kramer, Un­
derstanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994). 
